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The Institutional Case for Judicial Review
Jonathan R. Siegel
ABSTRACT: The “popular constitutionalism” movement has revived the
debate over judicial review. Popular constitutionalists have attacked
judicial review as being illegitimate in a democracy or inconsistent with
original intent, and they have argued that the Constitution should be
enforced through popular, majoritarian means, such as elections and
legislative agitation. This Article shows in response that the judicial process
has institutional characteristics that make judicial review the superior
method of constitutional enforcement. Prior literature has focused on just
one such institutional characteristic—the political insulation of judges.
This Article, by contrast, shows that the case for judicial review rests on a
whole range of institutional distinctions among the judicial, electoral, and
legislative processes. Most important among these distinctions are that the
judicial process is focused (it resolves issues discretely, without entangling
them with other issues), whereas the electoral process is unfocused; and the
judicial process is mandatory (a complainant can invoke it as of right),
whereas the legislative process is discretionary. The full range of its
distinctive institutional characteristics, not just the political insulation of
judges, normatively justifies judicial review.
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INTRODUCTION
The counter-majoritarian difficulty is back. Judicial review, that
hallowed American institution, is once again under attack. After decades of
praising the bold societal reforms achieved via judicial review, scholars—
mostly, liberal scholars faced with a more conservative Supreme Court—
have rediscovered objections to the practice.
Some of these scholars object to judicial review on historical, originalist
grounds. They claim that, contrary to decades of settled understanding, the
Framers never intended courts to enforce the Constitution.1 Other scholars
attack judicial review as inconsistent with democracy. Unelected,
unaccountable judges, these scholars claim, should not have the final word
on the Constitution.2
These critiques of judicial review constitute a movement—the “popular
constitutionalism” movement. The popular constitutionalists suggest that
the Constitution should not be enforced by judges, but by popular
mechanisms. The “people themselves,” some say, should enforce the
Constitution, via elections, public debate, and similar means.3 Others
suggest that the elected legislature, not the undemocratic courts, should
interpret and enforce the Constitution.4
Naturally, judicial review has its defenders. In response to the popular
constitutionalism movement, some scholars defend judicial review on
textual and historical grounds.5 Others defend judicial review normatively.6
The debate continues as the popular constitutionalists offer rebuttals and
further arguments.7

1.
See generally Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court,
115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001).
2.
See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).
3.
Kramer, supra note 1, at 26–29.
4.
TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 154–76; Waldron, supra note 2, at 1348–49, 1375–76.
5.
See generally Bradford R. Clark, Unitary Judicial Review, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 319
(2003); John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 VA. L. REV.
333 (1998); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 887 (2003).
6.
See generally Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A
Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1013 (2004); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an
Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1699 (2008); Frederick Schauer, Judicial
Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1045 (2004).
7.
E.g., Mark Tushnet, How Different Are Waldron’s and Fallon’s Core Cases for and Against
Judicial Review?, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (2010); Jeremy Waldron, Judges as Moral
Reasoners, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 2 (2009). For other recent contributions to the discussion, see,
for example, Todd E. Pettys, Popular Constitutionalism and Relaxing the Dead Hand: Can the People
Be Trusted?, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 313 (2008); David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular
Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047 (2010); Jedediah Purdy, Presidential Popular
Constitutionalism, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837 (2009); Jamal Greene, Giving the Constitution to the
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A vital argument, however, is missing from these exchanges. What is
needed in defending judicial review is an institutional analysis. Such analysis
would explain why judicial review is the superior mechanism for
constitutional enforcement based on the institutional characteristics of courts.
It would analyze the ways in which the characteristics of the judicial process,
and, comparatively, the characteristics of the electoral and legislative
processes, contribute to making each process likely or unlikely to serve as a
good mechanism for constitutional enforcement.
The normative defenders of judicial review do provide some
institutional analysis, but not much. They make just one point in this regard.
Specifically, they echo Alexander Bickel’s classic defense of judicial review as
providing a necessary check on political actors by others who are insulated
from the political process.8 However, that observation, while important, is
only part of the story. A more thorough institutional analysis would reveal
other, vital ways in which the characteristics of the judiciary make judicial
review the superior mechanism for enforcement of constitutional
constraints on government.
This Article provides the institutional analysis that is missing from
existing literature. The Article compares and contrasts the judicial process
with the processes that the popular constitutionalists suggest as mechanisms
for enforcing the Constitution—namely, the electoral and legislative
processes. This comparison demonstrates the superiority of the judicial
process as a constitutional enforcement mechanism. Indeed, it suggests that
only a process of judicial constitutional enforcement is consistent with the
concept of constitutional “rights.”
Several institutional characteristics of courts combine to achieve this
result. The most important of these characteristics (and the one most
overlooked by the popular constitutionalists) is that the judicial process is
focused. Specifically, the judicial process considers claims of right discretely
and does not entangle them with unrelated issues. This critical feature
allows the judicial process to reach a clear judgment on constitutional issues
in a way that the electoral process cannot. In contrast, the electoral process
is completely unfocused. It entangles issues together, which blocks it from
providing a clear judgment on any one issue. This fundamental distinction
severely undercuts the ability of the people to use elections to enforce the
Constitution.
In addition, the judicial process exhibits several other key institutional
characteristics. The judicial process is transparent: it provides reasons for its
decisions. The process is individually engageable: a single person with a claim

Courts, 117 YALE L.J. 886 (2008) (book review); and Alec Walen, Judicial Review in Review: A
Four-Part Defense of Legal Constitutionalism, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 329 (2009) (book review).
8.
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 25–26 (1962).
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of right can utilize the process without having to attract support from others.
The process is mandatory: courts must consider and rule on properly
presented claims of right. The process employs a system of precedent: rights,
once established, tend to remain established. And finally, the process is
nonmajoritarian: claimants do not have to demonstrate majority support to
have their rights enforced.9
These critical characteristics make judicial review the superior process
for enforcement of constitutional rights. The existing literature on judicial
review has primarily focused on just one of these characteristics—the last
one, the nonmajoritarian character of the process.10 Other characteristics of
the process have been neglected. This Article suggests that it is really all of
these characteristics, in combination, that make judicial review superior.
The Article proceeds as follows. First, Part I sets the scene by briefly
recounting the recent rise of the popular constitutionalism movement. This
Part sets forth the classic justification for judicial review, the classic attack
on, and defense of, judicial review by Alexander Bickel in the 1960s, and the
more recent attacks on judicial review by the scholars of the popular
constitutionalism movement. This Part also explains the defenses of judicial
review that other scholars have given in response to this new movement.
Part II then presents an institutional defense of judicial review. It
considers what would actually happen if someone tried to enforce
constitutional rights using the mechanisms suggested by the popular
constitutionalists—that is, the electoral or legislative processes. Neither the
popular constitutionalists nor scholars responding to them have given
sufficient attention to how these processes actually work. Part II therefore
conducts a thought experiment that imagines how citizens might try to use
the electoral or legislative processes to redress constitutional grievances. It
compares these potential enforcement processes to the judicial process. It
argues that the electoral and legislative processes cannot be adequate
mechanisms for the enforcement of constitutional rights because they lack
the institutional characteristics of judicial review listed above.
In contrast to the judicial process, the electoral and legislative processes
each have some subset of the characteristics of being unfocused, inscrutable,
nonmandatory, only collectively engageable, majoritarian, and not relying
on precedent. As already noted, whereas the judicial process is focused, the
electoral process is completely unfocused. Even if a constitutional grievance
became an issue in an election, it would be only one of dozens or hundreds

9.
I previously explored the importance of some of these characteristics of the judicial
process in the narrower context of considering the political question doctrine. See Jonathan R.
Siegel, Political Questions and Political Remedies, in THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 243, 243–68 (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah & Bruce E. Cain
eds., 2007). This Article builds on my previous analysis and applies it to the broader question of
judicial review.
10.
See infra Parts I.B, I.C.2.
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of issues. Voters cannot, therefore, use the electoral process to decide a
constitutional issue in the way a litigant can use the judicial process.
Moreover, whereas the judicial process is mandatory, the legislative process
is discretionary—the legislature can ignore constitutional grievances
indefinitely. And whereas the judicial process is individually engageable, the
electoral and legislative processes both require collective action to achieve
results. These differences, and the other institutional differences explored
in Part II, make the judicial process superior to either the electoral or
legislative process for the enforcement of constitutional rights.
Part III therefore suggests that judicial review is normatively justified
because it is in society’s best interest that people whose constitutional rights
are violated have a mechanism available for redress that has the
characteristics of the judicial process. As the thought experiment of Part II
demonstrates, the judicial process is institutionally structured to serve as a
good enforcement mechanism for constitutional constraints. The electoral
and legislative processes are not. Part III therefore concludes that the
institutional characteristics of the judicial process justify judicial review. At
the same time, Part III also recognizes that the popular constitutionalists
have identified a weakness in the system of judicial review, and it therefore
considers potential improvements to that system. Part III shows how an
understanding of the institutional structure of judicial review supports
suggestions for some possible improvements—in particular, improvements
that would increase the system’s democratic responsiveness while not
depriving it of the institutional characteristics that make it the superior
mechanism for enforcement of the Constitution.
I.

THE REVIVED DEBATE OVER JUDICIAL REVIEW

For decades, judicial review enjoyed general approval in American legal
thinking.11 Recently, however, scholars have revived the debate over its
legitimacy.12 Scholars have rediscovered the “[c]ounter-[m]ajoritarian
[d]ifficulty” noted by Alexander Bickel in the 1960s.13
Unlike Bickel, however, they do not find judicial review to be
nonetheless justified on the basis of judges’ allegedly superior ability to
interpret and apply the Constitution.14 Rather, the recent wave of
scholarship opposed to judicial review insists that the Constitution should be
enforced by the people themselves or by the people’s elected
representatives.15

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Fallon, supra note 6, at 1694.
See infra Part I.C.
BICKEL, supra note 8, at 16.
Id. at 23–28.
See infra Part I.C.
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In response to this recent wave of “popular constitutionalism,” other
scholars have come to the defense of judicial review.16 Some have justified it
on textual or historical grounds.17 Others have defended judicial review on
normative grounds based on the nature of the judiciary.18
This Part briefly recounts the pendulum swings in the debate over
judicial review and notes the current bases on which the practice is being
attacked and defended.
A. THE INSTITUTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review is a venerable institution in American democracy, having
existed nearly as long as America itself. In Marbury v. Madison, the first case
in which the Supreme Court exercised the power to disregard an
unconstitutional statute passed by Congress, Chief Justice John Marshall laid
out arguments in favor of judicial review.19 Chief Justice Marshall’s familiar
opinion need not be reviewed here in detail. It is, however, well worth
recalling the basics of Marshall’s arguments, for they set up the debate that
continues today—more than two centuries later.
Marshall relied primarily on the “principle, supposed to be essential to
all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void.”20
Marshall derived this principle from the fact that the Constitution emanates
from the “original and supreme will” of the nation—the people.21 Because
the Constitution comes from the people themselves, it is the “fundamental
and paramount law of the nation” and is superior to any act of the
legislature.22 The Constitution, Marshall noted, limits the powers that the
people have vested in the legislature, and these limits would be meaningless
if they did not confine the legislature.23 An act of the legislature that
conflicts with the Constitution is therefore void.24
Moreover, Marshall said, not only are unconstitutional statutes void, but
the determination of whether a statute is unconstitutional is part of the
judicial function.25 The courts are to treat the Constitution “as a paramount

16.
Strictly speaking, not all of the defenders of judicial review cited herein wrote “in
response” to popular constitutionalist attacks. Some defenses of judicial review cited herein
were written in connection with scholarly debate about the issue of judicial supremacy, which
occurred just before the rise of the popular constitutionalism debate. But the subjects are
closely related and can be considered together.
17.
See infra Part I.D.
18.
See infra Part I.D.
19.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
20.
Id. at 180.
21.
Id. at 176–77.
22.
Id. at 177.
23.
Id. at 176–77.
24.
Id. at 177.
25.
Id. at 177–78.
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law,”26 and, as he most famously remarked, “It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”27 Therefore, just
as courts must decide between the operation of two laws that conflict, they
must also resolve conflicts between the Constitution and enacted law, and in
doing so they must treat the Constitution as the superior authority.28 Doing
otherwise “would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions.”29
In addition to this general, theoretical argument, Marshall found
support for judicial review in the text of the Constitution.30 The
Constitution, Marshall observed, grants the courts power to hear “all cases
arising under the constitution,”31 and a court could not, Marshall asserted,
decide a case arising under the Constitution without enforcing that very
document.32 Marshall noted clauses that specifically restrain the legislative
power (for example, the clause forbidding the imposition of any tax on
exports) and inferred that courts could not “close their eyes” to these clauses
and enforce laws that violate them.33 He also observed that the Constitution
requires judges to take an oath to support it, which, he said, implied that
judges must enforce the Constitution.34 Finally, Marshall found textual
support for judicial review in the Supremacy Clause, which elevates the
Constitution to the supreme law of the land and gives the same character
only to laws made pursuant to the Constitution.35
B. ALEXANDER BICKEL’S ATTACK ON, AND DEFENSE OF, JUDICIAL REVIEW
Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison is often said to be one of the
greatest judicial feats of all time.36 Still, it has not gone unchallenged.
Writing in the 1960s, Alexander Bickel claimed that Marshall’s analysis not
only begged the question, but begged the wrong question.37 The real
question, according to Bickel, is not whether an unconstitutional law is void
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 178.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 177–78.
Id. at 178.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 179.
Id.
Id. at 180.
Id.
See, e.g., CLIFF SLOAN & DAVID MCKEAN, THE GREAT DECISION: JEFFERSON, ADAMS,
MARSHALL, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE SUPREME COURT, at x (2009) (asking why Marbury is
“considered the greatest decision in American law”); Louise Weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1235, 1244 (2003) (calling Marbury “our greatest case”); see also, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON,
JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 68 (6th ed.
2009) (noting that Marbury “is widely regarded as a political masterstroke”); Theodore B.
Olson, Remembering Marbury v. Madison, 7 GREEN BAG 35, 42 (2003) (also referring to Marbury
as a “masterstroke”).
37.
BICKEL, supra note 8, at 2.
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(of course that is true), but who should decide whether a law is
unconstitutional.38 Marshall, Bickel said, gave little analysis to this critical
issue; he simply assumed that courts could rule on the constitutionality of
statutes.39 Marshall failed to rebut the possibility that this role properly
belonged elsewhere—that it should be performed by Congress itself, by the
President, by juries in criminal cases, or ultimately by the people.40
Bickel considered Marshall’s various arguments and concluded that
none of them could show that the determination of the constitutionality of
statutes is properly a judicial function. Bickel rejected Marshall’s argument
that judicial review follows from the very existence of a written
Constitution.41 While it may seem absurd that only the legislature would
enforce the constitutional limits on its own power, Bickel noted that, under
Marshall’s scheme, only the courts enforce the constitutional limits on
judicial power.42 Bickel further observed that judicial self-policing seems
even more absurd than legislative self-policing because courts are not
checked by elections.43 Something more than the very existence of the
Constitution is therefore needed to show that the Constitution is judicially
enforceable.
Bickel also found Marshall’s textual constitutional arguments lacking.
Clauses that specifically constrain legislative power add nothing, Bickel
argued, to the general argument for judicial review.44 The Oath Clause
proves nothing because the clause applies equally to judicial, executive, and
legislative officials.45 And the Supremacy Clause, Bickel argued, serves only
to make federal law supreme over state law, not to give federal courts the
power to determine the constitutionality of federal statutes.46
The lack of solid grounding for judicial review is particularly
troublesome, Bickel observed, because judicial review is “countermajoritarian.”47 Courts exercising the power of judicial review claim to be
acting in the name of the people and to be enforcing the commands that
the people enshrined in the Constitution.48 But in striking down a statute
enacted by a democratically elected legislature, courts thwart the actions of

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3–4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8–12.
Id. at 16.
Id.
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the current popular majority.49 Therefore, Bickel argued, judicial review is a
“deviant institution” in a democratic society.50
Yet despite his criticism of Marshall’s arguments in favor of judicial
review, Bickel nonetheless resuscitated the practice with an argument of his
own. Judicial review is appropriate, Bickel argued, precisely because of its
counter-democratic nature.51 The Constitution embodies our society’s
enduring, long-term values. Such values may clash with more immediate
needs, and the political accountability of elected officials makes them
particularly vulnerable to the influence of short-term interests.52 By contrast,
the political insulation of judges puts them in a good position to enforce our
long-term values when those values clash with popular short-term desires.53
Thus, Bickel concluded, it is beneficial to have the acts of politically
accountable officials reviewed for constitutionality by politically insulated
judges.54
Bickel saw other advantages to judicial review as well. He claimed that
the judiciary is superior to the legislature at constitutional interpretation
because judges have specialized scholarly training and the institutional habit
of acting on principle.55 The legislature, on the other hand, for the most
part operates “with a different set of gears” and would likely find it difficult
to switch its focus to the enforcement of constitutional principle when the
occasion demanded.56 He also saw advantage in the judicial practice of
acting on “the flesh and blood of an actual case” as opposed to the
abstraction of a statute.57 Bickel’s main defense of judicial review, however,
was that constitutional principles are best enforced by politically insulated
actors.58 His argument became a standard, normative defense of the
institution of judicial review.59
C. THE MODERN REVIVAL OF THE DEBATE
After Bickel’s seminal analysis, judicial review again enjoyed general,
and even rather uncritical, acceptance, which continued for a long time—
indeed, Charles Black prescribed “two aspirin and a good night’s sleep” for

49.
Id. at 16–17.
50.
Id. at 18.
51.
Id. at 24–26.
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Id. at 26.
57.
Id. For more on this point, see infra note 208.
58.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
59.
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing
the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 142–43 (1997) (referring to Bickel’s argument as “the
classic modern argument” in support of judicial review).
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those who doubted its legitimacy.60 Recently, however, scholars have revived
the debate over judicial review. In part, this may result from recent changes
in the composition of the Supreme Court. So long as judicial review
produced results that were cheered by the mostly liberal legal academy, most
scholars had little impetus to question the practice. Now that judicial review
by a more conservative Supreme Court frequently blocks liberal political
action (as, for example, when the Court strikes down affirmative-action
programs61 or eliminates limits on campaign spending by corporations62),
scholars are recalling that the Supreme Court, over the course of American
history, has often been a conservative or reactionary force, and they are
finding themselves increasingly prone to question the legitimacy of judicial
review itself.63
Recent attacks on judicial review have taken two main forms. One is
historical: scholars have asserted that the Framers and the founding
generation never intended courts to treat the Constitution as ordinary,
judicially enforceable law, but rather that the people themselves were to
enforce the Constitution through the electoral or legislative process. The
other argument rediscovers the counter-majoritarian difficulty: scholars have
asserted that the principles of democracy demand that questions of
constitutionality be resolved by politically accountable officials, not by
politically insulated judges.
1. Historical Claims About Means of Enforcing the Constitution
Professor Larry Kramer attacks the historical basis for judicial review.64
Kramer asserts that the framing generation never intended courts to treat
the Constitution as ordinary, judicially enforceable law.65 Rather, the
Constitution was “fundamental law,” and its enforcement was not to be a
judicial responsibility, but rather the concern of the people themselves.66
Kramer asserts that the founding generation regarded “the people” not
as an abstraction but as a group that could speak and take responsibility “for
seeing that the Constitution was properly interpreted and implemented.”67
In the ratification debates, federalists asserted that if the new national
government violated the Constitution, it would face popular resistance.68 In

60.
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE HUMANE IMAGINATION 119 (1986); see also, e.g., Fallon,
supra note 6, at 1694 (referring to the desirability of judicial review as a “complacent
assumption” of American thinking).
61.
E.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
62.
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
63.
See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 129–53; Waldron, supra note 2, at 1350.
64.
Kramer, supra note 1, at 16.
65.
Id. at 26, 48–50.
66.
Id. at 49.
67.
Id. at 11–12.
68.
Id. at 43, 50, 73.
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particular, Kramer says, the framing generation intended elections to be the
primary mechanism for enforcing the Constitution.69 The framing
generation believed that the people would surely vote against politicians
who violated the constitutional restraints that the people had placed on
their behavior.70
Although exercising the right to vote was the “first and foremost” means
of popular constitutional enforcement,71 Kramer also notes other popular
means of resistance that could be used against unconstitutional
governmental action. The people could use the right of free speech to
denounce such action in petitions and pamphlets, they could resist
unconstitutional enactments while serving as state or local government
officials or as jurors, and they could also employ “mobbing”—taking direct
physical action to resist government encroachment on constitutional
rights.72 “The idea of turning this responsibility over to judges,” Kramer
asserts, “was unthinkable.”73
Kramer does not suggest that judicial review be abolished.74 He
recognizes that judicial review may even be necessary “to counter certain
endemic pathologies of party politics and representative assemblies,” but he
argues that our Constitution prefers democratic solutions and that we
should adopt a “minimal model of judicial review.”75 Kramer suggests that
the “New Deal settlement,” under which the Supreme Court enforces
constitutional restraints on the states and protects individual rights from
federal action, but leaves questions regarding the scope of congressional
power primarily to political resolution (subject to only very limited judicial
scrutiny),76 is “a sensible place to start.”77 Kramer particularly rejects the
modern development of what he calls “judicial sovereignty,” which suggests
that courts should not only interpret and enforce the Constitution as
ordinary law, but that constitutional interpretation by other branches, or by
the populace at large, is inherently suspect.78
2. Rejecting Judicial Review on Democratic Grounds
Even more ambitious than Professor Kramer’s call for a judicial review
that leaves some room for popular constitutional interpretation are recent
suggestions that judicial review should be abolished altogether and that
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 27, 50, 72–74.
Id. at 72–74.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 27–29.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 166.
Id.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 163.
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constitutional questions should be resolved only politically. The scholars
making this bold claim have, essentially, rediscovered the countermajoritarian difficulty. Unlike Professor Bickel, however, these scholars do
not resolve the difficulty by concluding that courts are institutionally better
than legislatures at interpreting and enforcing the Constitution. They reject
this conclusion and argue instead that the principles of democracy demand
that constraints on the democratic process be interpreted and enforced
democratically.
Professor Jeremy Waldron makes this argument in an article with the
arresting title, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review.79 In this article,
Waldron is not so concerned about the correct understanding of the U.S.
Constitution in particular.80 Rather, he considers the general problem of
whether judicial review is good or bad for a democratic society.81 Waldron
asserts that so long as a society meets several conditions—that it has a
representative legislature and nonrepresentative courts, both in reasonably
good working order, and that most members and officials of the society
share a commitment to the idea of individual and minority rights, but that
there are frequent disagreements about the content of these rights82—the
legislature should interpret the limits of its own powers and should not be
constrained by the judiciary’s understanding of the Constitution.83
Waldron denies that this practice will lead to worse decisions about the
content of rights. Political institutions, Waldron claims, are capable of
grappling with issues thoroughly and honorably, while at the same time
giving proper consideration to rights and principles.84 Pressures that
legislators face to deny rights may also affect judges.85 Moreover, legislators’
democratic responsiveness may put them in a better position than judges to
appreciate the plight of those seeking to have their rights vindicated.86
Even more important, Waldron claims that the principles of democracy
demand that constitutional questions be resolved democratically.87 The
content of constitutional requirements is typically disputed and subject to
good-faith disagreement. Democratic theory explains why we should
privilege a resolution of such disagreements reached by a majority of elected
representatives, but it cannot explain why we should give weight to a
resolution reached by a group of politically unaccountable judges, nor why
the judges should resolve disagreements among themselves by majority
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Waldron, supra note 2.
See id. at 1351–52, 1360.
See id.
Id. at 1360.
See id. at 1353.
See id. at 1384–85.
Id. at 1377.
Id. at 1378.
Id. at 1386–91.
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vote.88 It cannot be, Waldron explains, that the judges are merely
implementing a democratically reached societal precommitment to a certain
outcome because society will not have precommitted itself to a certain
understanding of the precise content of a disputable right.89 Even if it had,
Waldron says, a precommitment should not prevent society from
democratically changing its mind.90 The democratic credentials of
legislatures, Waldron therefore concludes, make them the superior vehicle
for resolving disagreements about the scope of rights.91
Professor Mark Tushnet also makes arguments for the abolition of
judicial review in his book Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts.92 Much
of the Constitution, he asserts, is “self-enforcing” in that it sets up
mechanisms, such as those famously noted by Professor Herbert Wechsler,93
that tend to ensure that the political process will result in enforcement of
constitutional constraints.94 Because judges are appointed politically, and
because the Supreme Court tends to follow the election returns, judicial
review, over time, “is likely simply to reinforce whatever a political
movement can get outside the courts.”95 But on the whole, Tushnet believes,
progressives and liberals are currently losing more from judicial review than
they are gaining from it.96 They should, therefore, prefer a system of
populist constitutional law in which constitutional issues would be resolved
legislatively.
D. RECENT DEFENSES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Naturally, the legal academy has responded to these recent attacks on
judicial review. Some scholars have revived and refined Bickel’s defense of
the practice. Others have relied on different arguments.
Some scholars defend judicial review on textual constitutional
grounds.97 They observe, for example, that the Supremacy Clause is
generally understood to permit judicial review, including federal judicial

88.
Id. at 1387–92.
89.
Id. at 1393–94.
90.
Id. at 1394.
91.
Id. at 1394–95.
92.
TUSHNET, supra note 2. In this book, Tushnet does not quite say, “Let’s get rid of
judicial review”—his final sentence is, “Perhaps it is time for us to reclaim [the Constitution]
from the courts.” Id. at 194 (emphasis added). He does, however, have a chapter entitled
“Against Judicial Review” in which he favorably discusses the possibility of abolishing judicial
review. Id. at 154–76. More recently, Tushnet has stated that Waldron’s “case against
constitutional review disposes of the other cases on offer.” Tushnet, supra note 7, at 51.
93.
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
94.
TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 95–128.
95.
Id. at 134–35, 152.
96.
Id. at 172.
97.
See generally Clark, supra note 5; Harrison, supra note 5; Prakash & Yoo, supra note 5.
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review, of state law to determine its compliance with the Constitution, and
they argue that the text of the Supremacy Clause makes no distinction
between judicial review of state law and federal law.98 The clause also does
not distinguish between judicial review based on individual rights and
judicial review based on structural provisions of the Constitution.99
Therefore, these scholars argue, the Supremacy Clause provides solid textual
support for judicial review.
Scholars also defend judicial review historically. These scholars claim
that the constitutional convention and the ratification debates, as well as
early state and federal practice, show that the Framers and ratifiers of our
Constitution intended courts to exercise the power of judicial review.100
Finally, scholars defend judicial review based on various normative,
structural, and institutional grounds. Some, like Bickel, see particular value
in entrusting constitutional enforcement to an institution largely insulated
from political pressure instead of one that is majoritarian.101 These scholars
see the Constitution as imposing “second-order,” long-term constraints on
the decisions of policymakers who may be honestly attempting to do what is
best for their constituencies, and they defend judicial review as an
appropriate mechanism for enforcing these constraints against decision
makers who may find it difficult to enforce limits on their own power in the
absence of an external check.102 Scholars also point to the “settlement
function” of law—the need to settle authoritatively what is to be done—as a
basis not merely for judicial review but for judicial supremacy.103 And some
scholars, even though somewhat persuaded by Waldron’s argument that
courts are not likely to be any better than legislatures at resolving
contestable questions of constitutional rights, nonetheless value judicial
review as providing a second veto gate through which government action
must pass before it can potentially endanger individuals.104 The
overenforcement of constitutional restraints that might result from this
system will, these scholars argue, be less costly than the underenforcement
that would follow from abolishing judicial review.105
II. A DIFFERENT DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The ongoing debate over judicial review makes clear that the popular
constitutionalists have shaken things up considerably. Judicial review was an
unquestioned mainstay of American law for decades. Now, even some of
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Prakash & Yoo, supra note 5, at 910–14.
Clark, supra note 5, at 335–48.
Prakash & Yoo, supra note 5, at 927–81; see also BICKEL, supra note 8, at 14–16.
Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 1016, 1022.
Schauer, supra note 6, at 1054–65.
Alexander & Schauer, supra note 6, at 1372–81.
Fallon, supra note 6, at 1699.
Id. at 1713–15.
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those defending judicial review are self-confessedly “uneasy” about it.106 It is
therefore vital to understand the case for judicial review.
As stated before, the purpose of this Article is to defend the practice of
judicial review against recent attacks, but with a different argument than has
been made in recent defenses. This Article does not concern itself with
whether the U.S. Constitution contains a textual basis for judicial review.
The text has been extensively mined elsewhere.107 Likewise, this Article does
not address the historical question of whether the Framers of our
Constitution intended it to be enforced through judicial review. Rather, the
defense of judicial review given in this Article is normative and, above all,
institutional. Thus, although the arguments presented herein apply to the
United States—and indeed, the United States will be the main focus—the
ultimate question, as with Waldron’s article, is the more general question of
whether a generalized, abstract society, with a representative legislature and
nonrepresentative courts, should desire its courts to exercise the power of
judicial review.108
Like some of the normative defenses recently (and not so recently)
offered, this Article agrees that one important value of judicial review is that
it provides a check by politically insulated officials on the actions of officials
who are politically accountable. But that is not the main focus of the
Article’s analysis. Rather, this Article argues that other institutional
characteristics of the judicial process make it the superior instrument for
enforcement of constitutional requirements.
The Article’s argument proceeds by examining what it would actually
mean to attempt to enforce the Constitution through either the electoral or
legislative processes. Imagine that the regime of “popular constitutionalism”
promoted by those who attack judicial review were in place. Imagine that
judicial review were now abolished, or that it simply had never been
available.109 Someone, however, believes that the government is acting
unconstitutionally. What is this person to do?
The thought experiment of imagining how a grievant would actually go
about attempting to enforce the Constitution by popular means immediately
reveals the tremendous obstacles that such a party would face. As I have
106.

Fallon titles his defense The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review. Fallon, supra note

6.
107.
See generally Clark, supra note 5; Harrison, supra note 5; Prakash & Yoo, supra note 5.
108.
See Waldron, supra note 2, at 1351–52, 1360 (noting that Waldron desires to address
the core question of whether an abstract society with specified characteristics should desire to
have judicial review).
109.
As discussed above, not every popular constitutionalist argues that judicial review
should be abolished. No one scholar defines what “popular constitutionalism” is, and this
Article is directed at an amalgam of popular constitutionalist positions. The Article primarily
addresses the suggestion of Waldron and Tushnet that judicial review should be abolished, but
it also draws on some of Kramer’s arguments as to how the Constitution might be popularly
enforced.
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elsewhere discussed in connection with an examination of the political
question doctrine,110 consideration of these obstacles highlights vital
institutional differences, both practical and theoretical, between the judicial
process and the electoral and legislative processes. These differences will
show that the judicial process is well constructed, and the electoral and
legislative processes, by contrast, poorly constructed, for the enforcement of
constitutional requirements.
A. ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
Popular constitutionalists suggest that the original intent of the framing
generation was that the people themselves would interpret and enforce the
Constitution.111 They note that, during the framing generation, people
spoke of submitting constitutional controversies to “the people.”112 To the
Framers, such an invocation of “the people” was “neither empty rhetoric nor
a veiled threat of revolution.”113 It was, rather, “the invocation of a very real,
very available legal remedy.”114
But how exactly would this remedy work? Popular constitutionalists
speak rather blithely about submitting a controversy to “the people,” but
“the people”—to say the least—do not have a convenient mailing address to
which controversies can be submitted. What would it actually mean to
submit a constitutional controversy to “the people”? What would “the
people” actually do to enforce the Constitution? According to those who
adhere to this view, one vital mechanism by which “the people” would
enforce the Constitution would be elections. Specifically, popular
constitutionalists assert that members of the framing generation suggested
that the people would control politicians who violated the Constitution by
voting them out of office.
Professor Kramer provides numerous quotations from the founding
period that take this view. Richard Dobbs Spaight, Governor of North
Carolina, who rejected judicial review as “absurd,” said that the better,
absolutely necessary check on government was “the annual election.”115 John
Randolph, a Congressman from Virginia, spoke of elections as “the true
check.”116 An anonymous “Jerseyman” wrote that “[e]very two years the
110.
See Siegel, supra note 9, at 258–68.
111.
E.g., Kramer, supra note 1, at 41, 43, 49.
112.
Id. at 41.
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
Id. at 50 (quoting Letter from Richard Dobbs Spaight to James Iredell (Aug. 12,
1787), in 2 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 145, 168, 169–70 (Griffith J. McRee
ed., Peter Smith 1949) (1857)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116.
Id. at 43 (quoting 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 660 (1802)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 661 (1802) (asserting that an appeal lies “through the
elections, from us to the nation, to whom alone, and not a few privileged individuals, it belongs
to decide, in the last resort, on the Constitution”).
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people may change their Representatives if they please; and they certainly
would please to change those who would act with so much baseness and
treachery [as to violate the Constitution].”117 George Washington himself
pointed out to his nephew Bushrod that whenever government power is
executed contrary to the people’s interests, “their Servants can, and
undoubtedly will be, recalled.”118
Even some judges, who might have been expected to favor judicial
review, took the view that elections, not judicial review, provide the true
remedy for a constitutional violation. For example, in 1825, when
Pennsylvania’s highest court first declared a state statute to be
unconstitutional under the state constitution,119 Justice Gibson vehemently
dissented from the court’s assertion of the power of judicial review.120 Justice
Gibson believed that the state legislature “ought . . . to be taken to have
superior capacity to judge of the constitutionality of its own acts.”121 The
remedy, in Justice Gibson’s view, for an error in the legislature’s
understanding of its own powers lay in “an exertion of the [public] will, in
the ordinary exercise of the right of suffrage”122—that is, by the public’s
voting against legislators whose understanding of their powers deviated from
the public’s understanding.
Indeed, even modern courts, which generally accept the power of
judicial review, sometimes echo these same thoughts. Although judicial
review is usually available today to enforce the Constitution, there are some
cases where it cannot work. For example, sometimes, under current
doctrine, there is no plaintiff with standing to challenge an alleged
constitutional violation.123 In other cases, an alleged constitutional violation
raises a “political question” not subject to judicial review.124 Such cases
provide an illuminating window into the system envisioned by the popular
constitutionalists, as the plaintiffs have no judicial remedy and are left with
such remedies as would be available to them under popular
constitutionalism. In some such cases, the courts (or individual judges) have
directed the disappointed plaintiffs to their electoral remedies. The courts

117.
Kramer, supra note 1, at 73 (quoting A Jerseyman, To the Citizens of New Jersey,
TRENTON MERCURY, Nov. 6, 1787, in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION 146, 148 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118.
Id. (quoting Letter from George Washington to Bushrod Washington (Nov. 10,
1787), in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 117, at 152, 154).
119.
Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825).
120.
Id. at 344–58 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
121.
Id. at 350.
122.
Id. at 355.
123.
E.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 170 (1974) (no private standing to
enforce the Statement and Account Clause).
124.
E.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228, 238 (1993) (alleged violation of the
Senate Trial Clause raises a nonjusticiable political question).
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have noted that a disappointed plaintiff can still “assert his views . . . at the
polls.”125 People without judicial remedies, courts observe, merely have to
“convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected
representatives are delinquent in performing duties committed to them.”126
Judges have suggested that if elected officials violate the Constitution, “they
will have to contend with public outrage that will ultimately impose its
sanction at the ballot box.”127
Thus, some people, both historically and currently, have with all
apparent seriousness suggested elections as a mechanism for enforcing the
Constitution against politicians who violate it. They do not merely suggest
that the whole political process, including the legislative process, can be
counted on to remedy constitutional violations. They specifically assert that
if politicians violate the Constitution, the populace at large will enforce it by
voting them out of office.
The possibility of enforcing the Constitution by using the entire
political process, with the goal of ultimately achieving legislative success, is
considered in the next section.128 But first it is necessary to address the
suggestion that the people themselves can enforce the Constitution through
elections. Let us think, therefore, about what that would really be like. What
would actually happen to anyone who attempted to enforce the Constitution
through the electoral process? Courts and scholars who blithely suggest that
people could use elections to enforce the Constitution by voting offending
politicians out of office have grossly neglected to consider this question. The
thought experiment of imagining what would actually happen shows that
any such attempt would immediately run up against institutional
characteristics of the electoral process, both practical and theoretical, which
demonstrate its inadequacy as a mechanism for the enforcement of
constitutional guarantees.
1. Practical Difficulties
Those who suggest that voters might use the electoral process to remedy
constitutional violations seem to have given little thought to how utterly
impractical such efforts would usually be. Consider the plight of
disappointed plaintiffs in cases in which judicial review is not available today.
William Richardson, for example, believed that Congress had violated the
Constitution’s Statement and Account Clause by authorizing the
government to withhold details of the CIA’s budget,129 but he learned in

125.
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179 (emphasis added).
126.
Id.
127.
Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (emphasis added), aff’d,
506 U.S. 224 (1993).
128.
See infra Part II.B.
129.
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 168–69.
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court that he lacked standing to obtain judicial review—and, judging from
the court’s opinion, so did everyone else.130 Walter Nixon, an impeached
federal district judge, complained that the Senate had violated its
constitutional obligation to “try” his impeachment but discovered that his
case raised a nonjusticiable political question.131 The situation of these
disappointed plaintiffs provides a ready example of what life would be like in
a world without judicial review.132 What would these disappointed plaintiffs
do?
As noted above, courts in each of these cases explicitly suggested that
the plaintiff could seek a political remedy through the electoral process. But
that was hardly so in practice. The alleged constitutional violations were, first
of all, not of sufficient importance to gain any traction in the electoral
process. It is difficult to imagine either plaintiff’s getting any public
attention at all for their issues and impossible to imagine that they could
actually turn politicians out of office over them. Judge Nixon would have
faced the particularly daunting problem that he was the only one injured by
the alleged violation in his case; thus, he would have faced the impossible
task of getting the electorate to care about a problem that affected only him.
Richardson’s complaint at least affected everyone, but still, his issue was not
of sufficient importance that he could actually have turned politicians out of
office over it.
For these reasons, the alleged electoral remedy would simply not be
available as a practical matter. The same seems likely to be true for a very
substantial number of potential constitutional violations involving the many
constitutional provisions that are of a similar order.133 Thus, the first
difficulty with the suggestion that “the people” could enforce the
Constitution through elections is that, in many cases, doing so would be
wholly impractical.
Some who write against judicial review might not find this point
troublesome. Professor Tushnet, in particular, suggests that the essence of
130.
Id. at 179.
131.
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993).
132.
It should be noted that popular constitutionalists are most concerned about judicial
review of legislative action and do not necessarily condemn judicial review of executive or
administrative action. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 2, at 1353–54. The categories are not always
distinct (a challenged executive or administrative action may do no more than implement a
legislative command), and some cases do not fit neatly into any of them. For example, the Nixon
case cited here concerned action taken by the Senate, but not in its legislative capacity, see
Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228, and it is not entirely clear how popular constitutionalists would desire
courts to handle it. But the point of considering Nixon and Richardson is simply as illustrations of
the difficulties facing parties injured by allegedly unconstitutional action for which judicial
relief is not available.
133.
For example, it is difficult to imagine actual elections turning on alleged violations of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Origination Clause, the Emoluments Clause, or the Duty
of Tonnage Clause. See Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277 (2009) (striking
down a city ordinance as violative of the Duty of Tonnage Clause).
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constitutionalism lies not in the enforceability of lesser constraints such as
those imposed by the Statement and Account Clause or the Senate Trial
Clause, but only in the largest principles of freedom and equality.134 Tushnet
cares little about the availability of a mechanism for enforcing lesser details
of governance, even those that are embodied in the Constitution (he uses
the Emoluments Clause as an exemplar of provisions not worth caring
about).135 He thinks the point of constitutionalism is to carry forward what
he calls “the Thin Constitution” or “the Declaration [of Independence]’s
project,” which is what really “constitutes us as a people.”136
There are, of course, numerous problems with this view. Obviously, it
disregards the fundamental concept that the Constitution is a set of
instructions from the people, acting as principals, to their representatives, as
agents, that limits the agents’ authority to act. It substitutes the Declaration
of Independence for the Constitution as the document that defines
constraints on government—a strange choice, given that the Declaration
had a very different purpose and was never popularly ratified. It effectively
denies the people the ability to constrain the government with rules that
they think important enough to embody in the Constitution, even though
the rules would not be of a nature to capture attention in an election
contest—apparently, if a rule is not of that degree of importance, any
deviation from it is simply to be disregarded as trivial. It is entirely possible,
however, that the people might desire to ensure the permanent
enforcement of a detail of governance, and to put such a detail beyond the
power of their elected representatives to alter, rather than have to
perennially fight over such a detail legislatively.137
But most pertinent to the point of this section, even taking Tushnet’s
argument on its own terms—even imagining that somehow one should care
only about the enforceability of important constitutional provisions, however
importance might be defined—the same kind of practical difficulties
discussed above could easily block an electoral remedy for even the most
important constitutional violations. Tushnet posits that the essential
Constitution consists solely of a few principles—“equality, freedom of
expression, and liberty.”138 These grand ideas, we might imagine, could
actually capture some public attention in an election contest. But even if we
134.
See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 33–53.
135.
Id. He asserts that the clause has become “silly.” Id. at 37.
136.
Id. at 30–31.
137.
As Chief Justice Marshall remarked, the creation of the Constitution, by which the
people limited the powers of their elected officials, was “a very great exertion” that could not be
“frequently repeated.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). In that great
exertion, the people bound, not themselves, but their elected agents by laying down such rules
as they desired to put beyond the power of ordinary political processes. Tushnet’s rule would
make it impossible for the people to do this with regard to any matter that would not command
attention in the electoral process.
138.
TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 11.
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overlook the fact that Tushnet is condemning crucially important structural
constitutional provisions to unenforceability139 and limit ourselves to
worrying about individual rights, what about, for example, the criminal
procedure protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments or the Eighth
Amendment rights of prisoners? Surely these provisions are vital
constitutional protections, yet they are not rights that appeal to much of the
electorate. Given the politics of criminal defendants’ and prisoners’ rights,
there would obviously be the greatest practical difficulties in enforcing these
rights through the electoral process. Many exercises of the right of free
speech might, similarly, fare poorly in the political arena, as the right of free
speech is most important precisely when speakers use it to express politically
unpopular viewpoints.140
Moreover, there is simply no necessary correlation between the
importance of a claimed constitutional violation and the ability of voters to
use the electoral process to remedy the claimed wrong. Hardly any claim, for
example, could be more important than the claim that the 2000 presidential
election was stolen, yet voters who believed it was had no effective
opportunity to remedy it electorally. This was not simply because the claim
was resolved judicially instead of, as some thought it should have been, by
Congress.141 Even in a world without judicial review, in which Congress itself
had resolved the 2000 election dispute, voters who thought the election was
stolen would have had to wait two, four, or six years for the next opportunity
to vote against those who had done the alleged stealing. By that time, other
matters dominated the public’s attention, particularly the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Angry voters therefore had little ability to turn
subsequent elections into a referendum on the validity of the 2000 election.
Thus, even for the most significant constitutional violations, the electoral
process often offers no practical remedy.
Finally, even with regard to those issues that might gather some traction
in an election, the task of a citizen who desires to redress an alleged
constitutional violation through the electoral process would be immense.
Litigation is not cheap, but it is a bargain compared with elections. A citizen

139.
In other chapters of his book, Tushnet suggests that many of the structural provisions
are “incentive compatible,” that is, they create a structure in which the rules will be selfenforcing by virtue of the political process. Id. at 95–128. However, this still means that all the
structural provisions of the Constitution in fact impose no real constraints; they impose only
whatever system the Congress and the President work out. That hardly seems like what one
expects of a Constitution designed to constrain government action.
140.
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (striking down a statute prohibiting
desecrating the American flag); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) (striking down a
statute forbidding the unauthorized wearing of a military uniform in a theatrical production
unless the portrayal of the armed force involved “does not tend to discredit that armed force”
(emphasis omitted) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 772(f)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
141.
See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 300 (2002).
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who desired to bring a judicial challenge to, say, the failure of Congress to
publish the CIA’s budget, might have to spend tens of thousands of dollars
on legal fees, and this price tag might stand in the way of some legal
challenges. Still, it is nothing compared with what a citizen would have to
spend to engineer the electoral defeat of members of Congress who voted to
keep the CIA budget secret—especially to defeat enough members to
change Congress’s collective view on the issue. That bill would surely run
into the tens or hundreds of millions.
So while it is easy enough to suggest that a disappointed plaintiff take
his or her case to the polls, the suggestion would often be hopelessly
impractical. In most cases the electoral process would offer no relief for a
constitutional violation.
2. Theoretical Differences
Even more important, the difficulties with electoral enforcement of the
Constitution lie not just in practicalities. Rather, the practical difficulties are
symptoms of the larger structural and theoretical differences between the
judicial and electoral processes. Thinking further about why elections would
be such an impractical remedy for constitutional violations, and why the
judicial process works to provide a remedy, reveals a series of crucial
differences—institutional differences—between the two processes. These
differences show why the judicial process is well suited, and the electoral
process poorly suited, to ensure the enforcement of constitutional
requirements.
a.

Focused vs. Unfocused

First and foremost, the judicial process is focused. The judicial process
resolves a specific claim raised by a specific plaintiff. Assuming a plaintiff can
construct a justiciable case that properly raises an issue, the court will
address the particular issue presented. Of course, the plaintiff might lose,
but at least the plaintiff will get a ruling on the specific claim raised.
By contrast, the electoral process is entirely unfocused. Elections are not
referenda. Even if disgruntled citizens somehow managed to make an
alleged constitutional violation an issue in a congressional or presidential
election, it would never be the only issue. There are always innumerable
issues facing the electorate at any given time, and elections provide no
mechanism for voting on issues individually.142 In fact, voters do not vote for
“issues” at all; they vote for candidates. Each candidate represents a package
of positions on many different issues, in addition to general qualities such as
experience, trustworthiness, and charm.

142.
Donald L. Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and
Standing To Challenge Governmental Action, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 52, 99 (1985).

A3_SIEGEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1170

5/6/2012 4:03 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:1147

Thus, elections provide voters with no real way to register their views on
a particular alleged constitutional violation. At most, voters could vote
against a candidate who has participated in what they regard as a
constitutional violation. In doing so, however, they would also have to
consider whether that candidate had done well with the economy, foreign
policy, and other important issues.
This distinction is the most crucial institutional distinction between the
judicial and electoral processes, yet it is overlooked by those who suggest
that disgruntled citizens could use the electoral process to remedy
constitutional violations. Popular constitutionalists seem to imagine that if
politicians violated the Constitution, angry voters would rise up and vote
them out of office based on that alone.143 But in reality, the structure of the
electoral process means that the constitutional issue would, at most, be one
of dozens of issues that would all be jumbled together in an election.
Indeed, an election could easily involve multiple constitutional issues—
particularly in a world without judicial review. In such a world voters might,
and indeed probably would, have to try to raise multiple constitutional issues
in every election because, as the unending stream of suits challenging
government action shows, the government is always pushing the envelope of
its constitutional powers in many different directions at once. The jumbling
together of such multiple, possibly conflicting issues in a single election
could leave voters with no way of enforcing their constitutional views. For
example, if, in a given election, one candidate favors policies that arguably
violate the right of free speech, while her opponent favors policies that
arguably violate property rights, what is a voter who agrees with both
constitutional grievances to do? The voter would be able to express
disapproval of one set of policies only by ostensibly expressing approval of
the other. Again, the fundamental problem is that elections simply do not
present clean opportunities to express views on particular constitutional
issues.
Thus, the suggestion that, in a world without judicial review, citizens
could take their constitutional grievances to the polls and enforce the
Constitution so long as they “convince a sufficient number of their fellow
electors that elected representatives are delinquent in performing duties
committed to them”144 is almost absurdly naïve. It overlooks a fundamental,
structural feature of the electoral process. Because of the unfocused nature
of the electoral process, the disgruntled voter’s task would not simply be a
matter of convincing fellow electors that some politician or group of
politicians is violating the Constitution. It would be necessary to convince
the electorate that the violation is so severe that it overcomes whatever good
things those same politicians are doing. Unlike the judicial process, which

143.
144.

See quotations and examples gathered supra in text accompanying notes 111–28.
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
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provides a focused mechanism for resolving a specific constitutional claim,
the electoral process provides an unfocused mechanism in which the claim
would become entangled with economics, foreign policy, and every other
issue facing the electorate (probably including other constitutional issues),
as well as the personal qualities of the candidates involved.
b.

Transparent vs. Inscrutable

The unfocused nature of the electoral process necessarily leads to
another vital difference between the electoral process and the judicial
process: the electoral process is inscrutable, whereas the judicial process is
transparent. Because of its inscrutable nature, even success in the electoral
process is no guarantee of enforcement of constitutional norms.
Let us suppose, notwithstanding all of the tremendous difficulties
already discussed, that a group of voters who are upset about an alleged
constitutional violation by a government official manages to make the
violation an issue—indeed, a prominent issue—in the next election. More
than that, let us imagine that the group succeeds in using the election to
unseat the official. Would the group’s electoral success necessarily translate
into a remedy for the claimed constitutional violation?
Not at all. The problem is that no one can be sure exactly why a
politician was defeated. This is because, as discussed above, elections are
always about multiple issues. Therefore, even if the allegedly offending
politician is thrown out of office, there is no way to know why. It might have
been because the voters decided the politician’s actions were
unconstitutional, but it might also have been because of unfavorable
economic conditions, a scandal affecting the incumbent’s party, the
personal qualities of the challenger, or any of innumerable other reasons.
The election process is critically different from the judicial process in
this respect. A fundamental feature of the judicial process is that it gives
reasons for its decisions.145 The process does not simply produce a result.
The process is, in this respect, transparent.146
By contrast, the electoral process produces only a result. It gives no
reasons. Afterwards, pundits attempt to read the tea leaves to decide what
the election “meant” and to discern what “message” the voters were trying to
send. But as with all attempts to receive messages from “the people,” the
message lies more in the recipient than in the sender. The actual fact is that
the election process produces results but does not articulate norms.
The recent 2008 and 2010 elections provide excellent examples. In one
sense (probably more so than usual) the 2008 presidential election was a
145.
E.g., Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1292 (1975).
146.
The term transparent imperfectly captures the point made here, and it is used only for
want of a better term. In some respects the judicial process is the opposite of transparent: for
example, appellate courts, unlike legislatures, deliberate in private. The term transparent should
be understood here as meaning only “explaining the reasons for actions taken.”
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referendum on constitutional claims—claims that were working their way
through the judicial process, but at a frustratingly slow pace and with much
doubt as to whether they could ever be fully resolved judicially. These claims
included the allegations that the government was violating Fourth
Amendment rights on a mass basis through warrantless wiretapping,
unconstitutionally detaining prisoners without criminal charge or trial
(particularly at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), and subjecting prisoners to illegal
and possibly unconstitutional treatment, including torture.
These claims received considerable attention in the election,147 and the
country voted against the candidate of the party that was most responsible
for the alleged constitutional violations. But did the electorate, in choosing
Barack Obama over John McCain, vote against warrantless wiretapping,
detention without trial, and torture? Or did the electorate vote for Obama
simply because of the 2008 economic crisis? Or because it hoped he would
end the Iraq War? Or for any of dozens of other reasons? No one can say.
Yes, many people were upset by what they perceived as constitutional
violations, but many were also upset by the severe economic crisis of 2008,
many were against the Iraq War, and many had any number of other
concerns.148
There is no way to know the true reason the electorate voted for Obama
in 2008. The election result is, as always, inscrutable. Although some
constitutional issues played a prominent role in the 2008 election, the
election itself could not resolve those issues.
The same may be said of the 2010 midterm elections. The “Tea Party”
prominently advanced legal issues during the election campaign,
particularly the claim that the federal government is exceeding its powers
under the Constitution.149 The party had some notable successes, such as the

147.
See, e.g., Editorial, Barack Obama for President, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/10/24/opinion/24fri1.html; Editorial, Obama for President, BOS. GLOBE
(Oct. 13, 2008), http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/
2008/10/13/obama_for_president.
148.
In addition, the two main candidates for President were both against torture and in
favor of closing Guantanamo Bay, see Barack Obama for President, supra note 147, so the election
said even less than it otherwise might have about the voters’ preferences on these issues.
149.
See, e.g., Thomas Fitzgerald, Christine O’Donnell Emerges with Entourage and War Chest,
PHILA. INQUIRER (Oct. 2, 2010), http://articles.philly.com/2010-10-02/news/24999577_1_
new-campaign-headquarters-tea-party-express-supporters (quoting Tea Party candidate
Christine O’Donnell as planning to “lead the charge . . . for limited, constitutional government”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Kim Murphy, Alaska Senate Race Keeps Surprises Coming,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/20/nation/la-na-alaskasenate-20101020 (noting that Tea Party candidate Joe Miller “has campaigned on a message of
returning to strict constitutional government structures”); Matt Viser, In Ky. Race, Tea Partier
Tones it Down, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/
2010/09/20/in_ky_us_senate_race_rand_paul_tones_it_down (quoting Tea Party candidate
Rand Paul as calling for “limited constitutional government” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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election of Senator Rand Paul in Kentucky.150 But did Tea Party candidates
win because of their demand for “constitutional government,” or simply
because voters were fed up with the nation’s poor economy and high
unemployment rate? No one knows. As always, the election produced results
but articulated no norms.
The failure of the electoral process to articulate explanations for its
results means that the process cannot serve as a mechanism for the
enforcement of constitutional constraints. In order for politicians to follow
the voters’ judgment on constitutional issues, they would need to know what
that judgment is. But even the politicians involved cannot know for sure why
they were elected. As a result, they cannot know what the voters’ positions
are on any specific constitutional issue.
Therefore, elections cannot really enforce constitutional rights. Again,
the 2008 elections provide a good example. A popular constitutionalist
might try to argue that the elections established that holding prisoners at
Guantanamo Bay without trial is unconstitutional. But as of this writing,
more than three years after President Obama took office, the prisoners are
still there.151 Obviously the election did not establish a constitutional
principle the way a judicial judgment might. This is not an accident; it is the
inevitable result of the institutional difference that elections are inscrutable,
whereas judicial rulings are transparent.
Of course, one might observe that the judicial process is not perfectly
transparent either. Courts deliberate in secret, and judges are not always
candid in expressing the reasons that led to their decision.152 Still, as the
popular constitutionalists point out, the arguments for or against a
particular mode of constitutional enforcement are comparative.153 The

150.
Mark Leibovich & Ashley Parker, Tea Partiers and Republican Faithful Share Exuberant
Celebrations, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/us/politics/
03scene.html.
151.
E.g., Peter Finn, Guantanamo Detainees Cleared for Release but Left in Limbo, WASH. POST
(Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/guantanamodetainees-cleared-for-release-but-left-in-limbo/2011/11/03/gIQAJivM3M_story.html.
152.
Even judges sometimes accuse other judges of hiding their true reasoning. E.g.,
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (accusing
the majority of using legislative history as a “makeweight” for a decision arrived at for other
reasons); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 66 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(accusing the majority of manipulating standing doctrine so as to dismiss a case the majority
simply prefers not to hear).
153.
E.g., Waldron, supra note 2, at 1389, 1391, 1394. For example, in discussing the
legislature’s democratic credentials, Waldron acknowledges that legislators’ representativeness
is imperfect because of defects in the electoral process. Id. at 1389. But he notes that their
democratic pedigree is still far superior to that of judges. Id. at 1394. Similarly, Tushnet
acknowledges that “[t]he Constitution is not perfectly incentive-compatible” (that is, it is not
perfectly self-enforcing), but he observes that “judges are not perfect either” and that the
question is which of two imperfect alternatives gets us closer to our desired ideal. TUSHNET,
supra note 2, at 108.
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judicial process is not perfectly transparent, but it is far more transparent than
the wholly inscrutable electoral process. It is fundamentally different from
the electoral process in that it gives reasons for its decisions, whereas the
electoral process produces only a result.
c.

Precedent Based vs. Non-Precedent Based

The unfocused and inscrutable nature of the electoral process
necessarily produces yet another important contrast with the judicial
process—the electoral process does not operate within a system of
precedent. How could it? Given that there is no way to know what rule a
particular election lays down, there would be no way for the electorate to
follow that rule in future elections even if it wanted to.
Moreover, following precedent is simply not a norm of the electoral
process. The electorate’s changing its mind is a perfectly sufficient basis for a
different result in a new election. Thus, even if voters turned a politician out
of office because of their perception that he had acted unconstitutionally,
there would be no guarantee of the same result in a future election.
Therefore, politicians might or might not think it important to avoid
allegedly unconstitutional behavior that landed their predecessors in
trouble. Politicians might well hesitate to repeat behavior that had caused
other politicians to lose their offices. But they might also sense that the
temper of the electorate had changed, and they might risk the same
behavior again. Elections, therefore, cannot provide long-term redress for
constitutional violations. Even if voters “established” in some election that a
particular statute is unconstitutional, a subsequent legislature might not
repeal it or might pass it again if it were repealed, and the fight would begin
anew.
Of course, because judicial precedent can be overruled, one might say
that the judicial process never definitively resolves constitutional issues
either. But again, the argument is comparative. The judicial process at least
operates within a norm of following precedent. If the Supreme Court holds
that a statute is unconstitutional, one has a strong expectation that if
another legislature passed an identical statute, the courts would strike it
down. But one cannot have similar confidence about what the voters would
do in the next election.
d.

Majoritarian vs. Rights Based

The three points discussed so far are closely connected. They all stem
from the basic fact that elections are always about multiple issues. For this
reason, elections provide no focused way to resolve a particular
constitutional claim, they produce no clear statement of reasons, and they
cannot be followed as precedent. A quite different feature of the electoral
process, however, is that it is, of course, majoritarian. As numerous writers
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have observed, it therefore seems like a poor process for enforcing
constraints on majoritarianism.154
The majority of voters might like a candidate precisely because of the
candidate’s willingness to ignore constitutional constraints. One likely
reason why politicians would ignore constitutional constraints is that they
perceive some political advantage in doing so.155 This is particularly likely to
be true where the constitutional constraint involved provides protection for
unpopular or minority groups. Waldron and Tushnet tout the ability of the
political process to take minority views and rights seriously,156 but history
shows that politicians or voters often pass laws that impose burdens on
unpopular or minority groups or views.157 Even though the nation is
supposedly committed to taking minority rights seriously and respecting the
right to be different, there are certainly occasions when violating
constitutional rights would produce a political plus rather than the minus
posited by popular constitutionalists. On these occasions, elections would
fail to remedy the wrong.158
The judicial process is nonmajoritarian. The complainant comes to
court with a claim of right, not a claim of popularity. Success depends on
judicial recognition of the validity of the claim, not upon popular opinion.
Judges, being insulated from popular reprisal, are freer than politicians to
recognize constitutional protections in contexts where they might not be
popular.159 Of course, as popular constitutionalists observe, judges may not
do the greatest job of protecting unpopular or minority groups either.160 But
once again, the argument is comparative. The judicial process is not as
intrinsically stacked against minority positions as the electoral process is.
e.

Collective vs. Individualized

Finally, the electoral process necessarily requires collective action to
remedy constitutional violations. As the Supreme Court suggested in
Richardson, remedying a constitutional violation through the electoral

154.
E.g., BICKEL, supra note 8, at 23–28; Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 1016, 1022.
155.
BICKEL, supra note 8, at 25.
156.
TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 159–60; Waldron, supra note 2, at 1383–85.
157.
See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (refusing federal recognition to same-sex marriages, even
if valid under state law); Okla. Const. art. VII, § 1(C) (providing that the state’s courts “shall not
consider . . . Sharia Law”).
158.
For example, the Flag Protection Act, which the Supreme Court struck down in
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990), passed the House of Representatives by a vote
of 371 to 43, 135 CONG. REC. H6997 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1989), and the Senate by a vote of 91
to 9, 135 CONG. REC. S12655 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1989). These lopsided votes suggest that,
notwithstanding its constitutional infirmity, the statute was very politically popular.
159.
BICKEL, supra note 8, at 25–26.
160.
See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 8; see, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (upholding the “exclusion order” imposed against persons of Japanese ancestry during
World War II).
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process requires those who believe the violation is occurring to “convince a
sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are
delinquent in performing duties committed to them.”161 The electoral
process does not allow individuals, by themselves, to remedy a constitutional
violation. Effectively, the ability to remedy constitutional violations in the
electoral process does not belong to individuals; it can be achieved only by a
substantial group acting together.
By contrast, the judicial process is individually engageable. A plaintiff
can come to court alone and fight against the collective might of the
government. The government may have advantages even in the judicial
process (more resources, better lawyers, etc.), but the process effects a
substantial leveling of the playing field. Certainly, the plaintiff is not
required to collect a whole group of like-minded people together before
being entitled to a remedy.
This point is particularly significant for constitutional violations that fall
on individuals or on small groups. For example, as noted earlier, the alleged
constitutional violation in the impeachment of Judge Nixon affected him
alone. It would be impossible to gather a group of impeached federal judges
who were disgruntled by the procedure followed in their Senate trials.
Similarly, there are many governmental actions that primarily affect an
individual or a small group. It would be particularly hard to use the electoral
process to remedy a claim of constitutional violation with respect to such
actions. The judicial process, by contrast, is well suited to remedy
constitutional wrongs that fall upon a single individual.
*****
For all these reasons, the suggestion that people aggrieved by
constitutional violations seek a remedy in the electoral process seems
extremely dubious. In the debate over judicial review, considerable focus has
been placed on one difference between the electoral and judicial process—
the fact that the electoral process is democratic, whereas the judicial process
relies on unelected, unaccountable decision makers. As agreed above, that is
certainly an important distinction between the two processes. But there are
also other vitally important differences that explain why the judicial process
is much better suited than the electoral process for the enforcement of
constitutional rights and, indeed, why it seems almost essential to the very
concept of having constitutional rights. Having a focused, transparent,
precedent-based, individualized mechanism available for redressing
constitutional grievances is entirely different from remitting such grievances
to a process that is unfocused and inscrutable, that does not rely on
precedent, that requires collective action, and that is immensely expensive
to boot. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that a “right” enforceable only in
such a process is no right at all.
161.

United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
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B. ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH THE POLITICAL PROCESS
The previous section demonstrates that the electoral process has both
practical and theoretical differences from the judicial process that make it a
poor mechanism for the enforcement of constitutional requirements. But
perhaps, the reader might think, the discussion so far has been somewhat
naïve. Courts and commentators do speak of taking constitutional
grievances “to the ballot box,” and, as demonstrated above, some of their
statements suggest that at least some people intended this idea to be literally
applied.162 It is, therefore, important to consider that suggestion. (It is also
important for another reason that will become clear shortly.)163
Nonetheless, the discussion so far fails to capture the richness of the
process by which popular constitutionalists imagine that “the people” will
enforce the Constitution. Popular constitutionalists do not imagine that the
people will enforce the Constitution solely through the electoral process.
Rather, they imagine that the people will use the whole political process, of
which the electoral process is but a part, with the ultimate goal of achieving
success in the legislature.164 The people, in this view, will enforce the
Constitution partly through elections, but also through free speech, through
exercise of the right to petition, through interest groups, and through all
the other means that people use to attempt to bring about legislative
change.165 The electoral process is important, but an interest group does not
always have to turn a politician out of office in order to get what it wants; the
group need only show enough electoral strength to make the politician fear
being turned out of office in order to get at least some attention paid to its
desires.166 Besides, there is also the possibility of convincing the politician
that a claim is just and should be heeded simply because it is the right thing
to do. Thus, the full political process might produce good results for
constitutional grievants, ultimately winning them legislative success, even if
they lack the electoral strength to vote politicians out of office.
People have, in fact, had some notable successes in using the political
process to remedy constitutional grievances. The issue of same-sex marriage
provides an example. At least in federal court, the judicial process does not
currently appear to be the most hospitable forum in which to raise the claim
that the Constitution prohibits discrimination against same-sex marriage,167
162.
See supra text accompanying notes 111–28.
163.
See infra Part II.B.4.
164.
See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 2, at 1349, 1360.
165.
See Kramer, supra note 1, at 27; Waldron, supra note 2, at 1349.
166.
See Jack M. Beermann, Interest Group Politics and Judicial Behavior: Macey’s Public Choice,
67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 191–94 (1991).
167.
National gay-rights groups have carefully refrained from pursuing the same-sex
marriage issue in federal court, although two prominent lawyers have chosen to bring a federal
lawsuit raising an equal-protection challenge. See, e.g., John W. Dean, The Olson/Boies Challenge to
California’s Proposition 8: A High-Risk Effort, FINDLAW (May 29, 2009), http://writ.news.
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but gay-rights groups, working through the political process, have succeeded
in getting several state legislatures to permit same-sex marriage.168 This full
process of political agitation is, presumably, just what popular
constitutionalists have in mind when they say that the scope of constitutional
rights should be determined through the political process.
This section, therefore, discusses whether the whole political process
corrects the deficiencies of the electoral process discussed in the previous
section. Again, let us assume a world without judicial review, as posited by
popular constitutionalists, and imagine that an individual or group has a
constitutional grievance. If such a complainant were not limited to elections,
but could seek legislative relief through the full political process, would a
remedy be available?
In fact, this section suggests the political process, like the electoral
process, differs substantially from the judicial process, and, once again, its
majoritarian nature is just part of the story. The political process has other
institutional characteristics that make it a poor mechanism for the
enforcement of constitutional rights. In some respects the comparison
between the political and judicial processes is like the comparison between
the electoral and judicial processes (and to the extent that it is, the
discussion can be brief), but in other respects it is different.
1. Focused vs. Unfocused
The previous section noted that the judicial process provides a focused
mechanism for the consideration of a particular claim of right, whereas the
electoral process does not. The political process lies between the two. It is
capable of coming to a focused judgment on a claim of right, but its vagaries
might also result in the claim becoming entangled with other issues in a way
that blocks a clear judgment.
As Waldron observes, a legislature is capable of debating the merits of a
constitutional claim.169 In the course of passing a bill, a legislature could
debate and reach a judgment on whether the bill as a whole, or any
particular provision of it, violates constitutional rights. If some particular
provision in the bill might be unconstitutional, the legislature could debate
an amendment to eliminate that provision. By voting up or down on the
findlaw.com/dean/20090529.html (discussing the strategic decision of national gay-rights
groups to avoid litigation). That lawsuit has succeeded at the district-court level, and on a
narrow basis before an appellate panel as well, see Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10–16696, 11–16577,
2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012), but its fate, particularly in the Supreme Court,
remains highly uncertain.
168.
E.g., Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex Marriage,
Becoming Largest State To Pass Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
06/25/nyregion/gay-marriage-approved-by-new-york-senate.html; Abby Goodnough, Gay Rights
Groups Celebrate Victories in Marriage Push, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/04/08/us/08vermont.html.
169.
Waldron, supra note 2, at 1384–85.
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amendment, the legislature could reach a clear, focused judgment on the
constitutional question involved.
However, just because the legislative process is capable of such debate
does not guarantee that it will take place. The legislature might choose to
include an unconstitutional provision as part of an overall bill. Citizens and
interest groups could try to get the unconstitutional provision deleted, but
they would have no way to force the legislature to vote on that provision
separately. In the end, the people might have to decide whether they
support the overall bill, notwithstanding the presence of an allegedly
unconstitutional provision in it.
In such a case, the constitutional issue would get entangled with other
issues. The process would be more focused than the electoral process
inasmuch as the constitutional issue would get entangled with fewer other
issues. In the electoral process, every issue facing the electorate is always
entangled with every other issue, whereas in the legislative process,
entanglement is limited to such issues as find their way into the same bill.
Still, even a little entanglement could easily block a clear judgment on a
constitutional issue. If, for example, a bill would make a landmark change in
the availability of health insurance but would, at the same time, limit a
woman’s ability to obtain insurance coverage for abortion in a way that some
believe to be unconstitutional,170 citizens who favor health care reform, but
oppose the abortion restriction on constitutional grounds, would face a
dilemma. Of course, they could try to get the abortion provision deleted, but
they would have no mechanism to force a vote on that particular issue. If the
legislature chose to consider the bill as a whole without voting separately on
the potentially unconstitutional provision, citizens and interest groups would
face the tough decision of choosing between supporting a beneficial law and
thereby implicitly accepting the potential constitutional violation, or
opposing a bill that would help many people in order to protect a particular
group’s constitutional rights.
One might argue that, if the legislature adopts a law, it has necessarily
reached a judgment that all parts of the law are constitutional—especially in
a world without judicial review, in which the legislature would have sole
responsibility for the constitutionality of legislation. But this is not really so.
This could be said of the subgroup of legislators who are directly responsible
for drafting the particular law in question (say, the members of the relevant
committee). If that subgroup, however, chooses to embed a potentially
unconstitutional provision in a bill, the legislature as a whole still might not
170.
Cf. Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 222(e) (2009)
(prohibiting abortion coverage as part of the minimum benefits package). This is not to suggest
that the cited provision is unconstitutional, but only that it, or a similar provision, might raise a
constitutional issue. Governments are not required to fund abortions, see Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977), but a restriction on a woman’s ability to use her own money to obtain
insurance coverage for abortion could at least raise constitutional questions.
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consider the constitutional issue discretely. Passage of the bill might not
reflect the legislature’s collective judgment that all parts of the bill are
constitutional.
Indeed, even those legislators who were concerned about a particular
provision’s constitutionality might be unable to force a debate or a vote on
the constitutional issue. It would depend on the legislative leadership and
the legislature’s rules. Individual legislators might or might not be able to
force a clean, up-or-down vote on a particular provision of a bill.171 They
might only have the option to vote up or down on the bill in its entirety. In
such a case, again, the constitutional issue would be entangled with other
issues, and the legislators, like voters in an election, would have to weigh the
negatives of the perceived constitutional problem against the positives that
would come from enactment of the bill that they favored.
Indeed, legislators frequently state that they voted for a particular bill
even though they were not happy with every provision in it.172 Legislators
recognize that while they can work to improve bills, in the end they must
vote for a bill as a package and may not be able to control every detail of it.
They have to weigh its positives against its negatives and make their best
decision on the bill overall. The arguable unconstitutionality of a particular
provision of a bill would, similarly, have to be weighed against the good
done by the bill overall.
Therefore, while the legislative process is certainly superior to the
electoral process in terms of its ability to provide a focused mechanism for
debating and voting on constitutional issues, it is still inferior to the judicial
process in this regard. The legislative process may yield a clear decision on a
constitutional issue, but it may also entangle issues and force voters, and
even legislators, to decide whether they support an overall bill despite a
potential constitutional problem.
2. Inscrutable vs. Transparent
Similar observations apply to the question of whether the legislative
process is, like the electoral process, inscrutable, or, like the judicial process,

171.
This would be particularly true in the U.S. House of Representatives, where the full
body may consider legislation under a “closed rule” that limits amendments. CHARLES TIEFER,
CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE, RESEARCH, AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE
291–96 (1989). In the Senate, any senator may raise a point of order that a pending bill is
unconstitutional, id. at 506, although in practice such a procedure is rare. MARK TUSHNET,
WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 120 (2008).
172.
See, e.g., Press Release, Stephanie Herseth Sandlin, U.S. Representative, Comments on
Stimulus & Recovery Package Conference Negotiations (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://
www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/auth/checkbrowser.do?rand=0.6727854520731715&cookieSt
ate=0&ipcounter=1&bhcp=1 (quoting a U.S. Representative who explained that she voted for
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act even though “no bill is perfect, and this bill is not
perfect”).
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transparent. Again, it lies somewhere between the two. Unlike the electoral
process, the legislative process is at least capable of giving reasons for its
decisions. Legislators can, either individually or collectively, explain why
they believe a certain statutory provision to be constitutional or
unconstitutional.173 But once again, the legislative process does not
guarantee this result. Legislators may choose not to give reasons. Also, as
suggested in the previous subsection, a legislature may choose to pass a bill
without ever holding a vote on a specific, potentially unconstitutional
provision within the bill. In such a case, it seems particularly likely that
legislators might choose to cast their votes without stating their reasoning as
to the constitutionality of that provision.
A couple of examples show these different possibilities. On the one
hand, when the Senate debated the District of Columbia House Voting
Rights Act of 2007, which would have given the District of Columbia a voting
representative in the U.S. House of Representatives, senators expressed their
views on the obvious constitutional concerns that the bill raised.174 A
legislative debate on constitutionality, then, is certainly possible. But in that
case the bill was closely focused on the issue of D.C. voting rights,175 and the
constitutional question went to the heart of the bill. By contrast, when
Congress, in 1988, amended the diversity-jurisdiction statute to provide that
aliens admitted for permanent U.S. residence would be deemed citizens of
the state in which they reside,176 it did so as part of a substantial bill that
covered numerous topics,177 and members of Congress did not express a
view on the constitutional issue that subsequently arose as a result of that
particular change.178 So a potentially unconstitutional provision may be
173.
Legislators are more likely than judges to give reasons individually, rather than
subscribing to a single opinion. As courts learned long ago, giving reasons seriatim dilutes the
power of the process to articulate a norm; it is better for the decision makers to subscribe to a
single opinion. But legislators are at least capable of giving reasons, and a committee report, for
example, may provide a suitable vehicle for giving something like an “official” explanation for
why a particular statutory provision is constitutional. A statute may also contain a “findings”
section that could give reasons.
174.
153 CONG. REC. S11626–32 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 2007). Obviously, the concern is that
the Constitution provides representation in the House of Representatives to states, and the
District of Columbia is not a state.
175.
See S. 1257, 110th Cong. (2007).
176.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). This provision was recently amended to cure the
constitutional problem discussed in the text. See Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue
Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, § 101, 125 Stat. 758, 758 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)).
177.
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 203, 102 Stat.
4642, 4646 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332). The full statute covered over
thirty pages in the Statutes at Large.
178.
The problem was that the statute apparently instructed district courts to hear, under
diversity jurisdiction, certain cases in which an alien was a party on both sides of the controversy
(if at least one of the aliens was “deemed” to be a citizen of a state), which might be outside the
scope of the judicial power under Article III. E.g., Saadeh v. Farouki, 107 F.3d 52, 54–55 (D.C.
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enacted without discussion of the constitutional issue. This example also
brings out the important point that a legislative debate on a law’s
constitutionality may not occur simply because the relevant constitutional
problem is not spotted during the legislative process. The judiciary, by
contrast, can examine the law’s constitutionality at any time after it is passed,
and so is available whenever a constitutional problem with the law comes to
light.179
3. Precedent Based vs. Non-Precedent Based
Like the electoral process, the legislative process lacks a system of
precedent. One legislature may repeal what a prior legislature enacted or reenact what a prior legislature repealed. Of course, as observed earlier, courts
also overrule prior decisions, but at least courts operate within a system that
takes precedent as its starting point and regards departure from previous
decisions as an exceptional circumstance that requires explanation. In the
legislature, there is no shame in changing a statute because the legislative
majority has changed.180 Thus, even if the legislative process established a
constitutional “right,” that right would remain subject to legislative
incursions or outright repeal at any time.
4. Mandatory vs. Discretionary
The first two difficulties with the legislative process discussed above are
really symptoms of the most important structural distinction between the
legislative and judicial processes: the judicial process is mandatory, whereas
the legislative process is discretionary. Part of the reason why legislators may
or may not vote cleanly on a constitutional issue, and may or may not give
reasons for their result, is that the legislature has discretion whether to act at
all. The legislative process is quite different from the judicial (and even the
electoral) process in this regard.
Plaintiffs can invoke the judicial process as a matter of right. If a
plaintiff presents a court with a justiciable case that is within the court’s

Cir. 1997). The history of the statutory provision suggests that members of Congress intended it
to apply in circumstances where it would have the effect of contracting diversity jurisdiction
(which would occur in cases in which an alien admitted to permanent residence and residing in
a state sues or is sued by a citizen of that same state), and that they did not realize that in some
circumstances the provision could have the potentially unconstitutional effect of expanding
diversity jurisdiction. See id. at 57–60 (reviewing the legislative history).
179.
Of course, this assumes the existence of a justiciable case. See infra Part II.B.4 for a
discussion of the impact of the justiciability requirements.
180.
Currently, for example, most Republicans are expressly running on their desire to
repeal the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”), and some also wish to
repeal the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. See, e.g., Ezra Klein,
At the Republican Debate, Who Would Bring You the Least Government?, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/at-the-republican-debate-who-wouldbring-you-the-least-government/2011/10/11/gIQALo13dL_story.html.
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jurisdiction, the court must decide the case. The plaintiff might, of course,
lose, but at least the plaintiff receives a decision on his claim. As Chief
Justice Marshall observed in Cohens v. Virginia:
The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure
because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot
pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with
whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it
be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is
not given.181
The legislative process, by contrast, is discretionary. Citizens have no
guaranteed way to invoke it. The Petition Clause of the Constitution ensures
that citizens have the right to ask for legislation, but it does not guarantee
that they will receive an answer—not even the answer “no.”182 Citizens may
argue to legislators that existing law must be changed because it is
unconstitutional, but the legislature may choose to ignore their complaints
indefinitely.183
The discretionary nature of the legislative process is its most serious
defect as a remedy for constitutional violations. Even the electoral process,
for all its difficulties, is mandatory. Elections occur at required intervals.184
But the legislative process can hardly be an effective remedy for
constitutional violations when citizens have no guaranteed way even to
invoke the remedy.
Of course, one might argue that if the legislature takes no action on a
constitutional grievance put to it by “the people,” then the legislature is,
effectively, taking the view that the grievance is meritless. But that is not so.
Just as silence is generally not acceptance,185 a legislature’s failure to adopt a
measure does not prove that the legislature agrees with the opposite of that
measure. There are innumerable reasons why a legislature may fail to act,

181.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
182.
Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) (“Nothing in the
First Amendment or in this Court’s case law interpreting it suggests that the rights to speak,
associate, and petition require government policymakers to listen or respond to individuals’
communications on public issues.”); We The People Found., Inc., v. United States, 485 F.3d
140, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Petition Clause does not provide a right to a response or
official consideration.”).
183.
Cf. Kramer, supra note 1, at 27 (noting that, before protesting it through action,
American colonists challenged the Stamp Act by petitioning Parliament, but Parliament
ignored the petitions and failed even to consider them).
184.
In some Parliamentary systems, such as that of Great Britain, the Parliament
(effectively, the majority party within the Parliament) has discretion as to when to call an
election. But there is, at least, an outer time limit between elections (in Great Britain, five
years). See Septennial Act, 1715, 1 Geo. 1 St. 2, c. 38 (Eng.); Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo.
5, c. 13, § 7 (Eng.).
185.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1979).
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and its inaction in the face of a constitutional grievance does not imply a
legislative judgment that the existing statutes are constitutional.
Indeed, even if a clear majority of citizens believed that an existing law
is unconstitutional, there would be no guarantee that they could get the
legislature to consider their grievance, much less to act on it, because there
are many obstacles to achieving legislative success even for measures favored
by a popular majority. The legislature might be malapportioned, as is the
case with the U.S. Senate. Even in a properly apportioned legislature, the
vagaries of districting might result in a legislature that does not accurately
reflect popular sentiment. The two houses of a bicameral legislature might
represent different constituencies, so that legislation might pass through
one house but not the other. In either house, legislation might have to pass
through a committee with different views from those of the house as a
whole. A committee chair alone might have the power to block legislation.
The rules of the legislature might permit a minority to block legislative
action, as in the U.S. Senate.186 The executive might have a veto over
legislation.
Finally, even if all the many actors in the legislative process agreed that
a constitutional grievance really ought to get fixed, the legislature still might
not be able to provide the remedy simply because of time pressure. The
legislature might be overwhelmed with other, more pressing matters. The
judicial process also entails famously frustrating delays,187 but at least it uses
a system of “parallel processing” in which not every matter has to go through
a single venue. The legislature might never find time to remedy a claimed
constitutional violation, but the judicial system will eventually find some
judge who can give attention to the matter.
In sum, the people can certainly try to remedy constitutional grievances
through the legislative process, but they face the daunting obstacle that the
legislative process cannot be invoked as a matter of right. If a legislature
chooses, it can, as Waldron observes, hold a debate on a constitutional
matter and reach a constitutional judgment. But it can always choose not to
do so, and the choice may be based not necessarily on the legislature’s
collective judgment that the constitutional grievance is meritless, but simply
on its discretion to do nothing.
This fundamental difficulty with the legislative process is another reason
why it is so important to first examine the institutional reasons why the
electoral process does not serve as an effective remedy for constitutional
violations.188 As remarked earlier, the previous section, by focusing only on
186.
See S. COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., 111TH CONG., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE R.
XXII
(2009),
available
at
http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RuleXXII
(requiring a three-fifths vote to close debate on any measure).
187.
See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1 (complaining of “the law’s
delay”).
188.
See supra Part II.A.
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the electoral process, might seem to reflect a naïve understanding of what
popular constitutionalists mean when they suggest that “the people” could
use popular methods to enforce the Constitution.189 But while the electoral
process is merely a part of the process popular constitutionalists have in
mind, it is the only part of the process to which the people have guaranteed
access. What are the people to do if they attempt to remedy a constitutional
wrong through the legislative process, but the legislature simply ignores
their grievance? In a world without judicial review, the people would be
thrown back on the electoral process as their only remedy. But, as the
previous section showed, that process is even less capable of remedying
constitutional violations than the legislative process. The combination of the
discretionary nature of the legislative process with the unfocused and
inscrutable nature of the electoral process is a double obstacle that makes
the overall political process a poor vehicle for enforcement of constitutional
rights.
Once again, one might try to counter these arguments by pointing out
that the judicial process is not perfect in this regard either. The judicial
process, although ostensibly mandatory, is in practice not perfectly so. The
judicial process is encumbered by justiciability requirements, including,
most importantly, the standing requirement, whereas the political process is
at least open to all, without regard to who is technically “injured” by a
constitutional grievance. Moreover, even in the face of an apparently
justiciable case, the courts have many escape valves—praised by some as “the
passive virtues”190—through which they can wriggle. Courts can sometimes
find a justiciability problem even when one is not really there,191 and the
political question doctrine is an official mechanism for declining to right
certain constitutional wrongs on the ground that they are not suitable for
judicial consideration. Some scholars even argue that the political question
doctrine confers a general judicial discretion to decline to decide otherwise
justiciable cases.192
A full answer to these arguments would be complex. I have elsewhere
discussed my disagreement with much of justiciability doctrine,193 and other
scholars have argued that the political question doctrine, although removing
some questions from the judicial purview, does not permit courts to exercise
general and unprincipled discretion in deciding what to decide.194 But for
purposes of the present discussion, the short answer, once again, is that the
189.
See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text.
190.
BICKEL, supra note 8, at 111–98.
191.
See, e.g., Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (dismissing an obviously justiciable case
on spurious grounds).
192.
BICKEL, supra note 8, at 187, 197.
193.
Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73 (2007).
194.
E.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 9 (1959).
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argument is comparative. It is not necessary to prove that the judicial process
is perfectly mandatory. It is only necessary to observe that it comes far closer
to this ideal than does the legislative process. There are some exceptions to
the general principle that courts must decide a claim of right properly
brought before them, but it is undoubtedly the general principle.195
Legislatures, by contrast, have the discretion to do nothing, even when
presented with a claim that current law violates the Constitution. It is the
discretionary nature of the legislative process, perhaps more than anything
else, that makes the process a poor vehicle for enforcing constitutional
rights.
5. Majoritarian vs. Rights Based
Like the electoral process, the legislative process is majoritarian. As
noted earlier, the existing literature has focused primarily on this point. As
with the electoral process, the majoritarian nature of the legislative process
makes it a poor vehicle for the enforcement of constraints on
majoritarianism. The Constitution exists to put certain points beyond the
power of ordinary political processes and to guarantee certain rights against
invasion from those processes. This point is of great importance, but it does
not need to be addressed here at length, both because it is already well
discussed in existing literature and because the arguments made above, in
connection with the electoral process,196 apply here as well.
One additional point is, however, worth noting. The popular
constitutionalists like the idea of remitting constitutional questions to the
legislative process because that process is majoritarian. But the claim of the
legislative process to be majoritarian with regard to constitutional questions
is, in fact, highly imperfect.
To say that the legislative process is “majoritarian” is to suggest that the
judgment of the legislature on a question can be expected to reflect the
collective judgment of the populace on that question. But can we have any
real confidence that the majority of the populace believes, for example, that
the Constitution does not require publication of the CIA’s budget? In fact,
because of the institutional characteristics of the electoral and legislative
processes discussed herein, the answer is no. It is entirely possible that most
of the populace, if their opinion about the meaning of the Statement and
Account Clause were specifically solicited, would say that it does require
publication of the government’s entire budget. And yet that same majority
might find the issue insufficiently important to consider as they make their
electoral choices.
There would therefore be little, if any, electoral pressure on members
of Congress to change the law to conform to the majority will on this

195.
196.

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
See supra Part II.A.2.d.
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constitutional question. Because the electoral process provides no focused
opportunity for “the people” to vote on individual constitutional questions,
legislators need respond only to those issues that could be expected to play a
meaningful role in the electoral process. With regard to many constitutional
issues, legislators might confidently expect that the issue will carry little
weight in voters’ choices once it is entangled with other, more important
issues. Thus, the unfocused nature of the electoral process spills over into
imperfect majoritarianism in the legislative process.
Of course, as the popular constitutionalists have observed, and as is
noted above, the arguments for and against methods of constitutional
enforcement are comparative. The legislative process is only imperfectly
majoritarian, but the judicial process is hardly majoritarian at all. The
judicial process gets some majoritarian input from the political role in the
selection of judges, but because judges are not politically accountable once
in office, the judicial process is, on the whole, nonmajoritarian. Thus, to the
extent that majoritarianism is thought to be a virtue in constitutional
interpretation, the legislature clearly wins over the judiciary. The point here
is not to deny the legislature’s superior claim to majoritarian status but
simply to point out that even that claim is imperfect.
6. Collective vs. Individualized
As observed earlier,197 the judicial process is individually engageable,
whereas the electoral process necessarily requires collective action to remedy
constitutional violations. A final, vital problem with the legislative process is
that it is much closer to the electoral process in this regard.
Technically, one might say that the legislative process is individually
engageable. Any person can ask for legislation. But practically, as noted
earlier, the legislative process is not “engageable” at all.198 Anyone, or any
group, can seek legislation, but no one has a right to any response. The real
question, therefore, is what kind of action is likely to yield a legislative
response. While it is not impossible for a single individual to instigate
legislative action, getting a response out of a legislature typically requires
collective effort. This feature of the legislative process would tend to make
many constitutional injuries, such as those falling on individuals or on small
or minority groups, particularly difficult to remedy.
Moreover, many widespread constitutional violations might fare no
better. The collective nature of the legislative process is particularly
important because of the many free-rider and collective-action problems
that it generates. As social scientists have long observed, the legislative
process poses obstacles to reforming laws that slightly burden a broad group,
particularly if, at the same time, the law provides substantial benefits to a

197.
198.

See supra Part II.A.2.e.
See supra Part II.B.4.
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small, concentrated group.199 The legislative process makes it all too easy to
pass or preserve “rent-seeking” laws that benefit a small group at the expense
of the public interest.200
This point could easily apply to a constitutional violation. A law might
slightly violate the constitutional rights of many people, while greatly
benefiting a concentrated group. In such a case, the legislative process
might provide no remedy because of collective-action problems.
The popular constitutionalists envision the legislature as fully capable of
having rational, public-spirited debates about constitutional issues.201 This
picture might even be accurate as to issues that truly excite the passions of
the general populace. One can imagine a legislature having a deep debate
about the constitutionality of abortion restrictions202 or laws prohibiting
same-sex marriage because the populace is fully engaged in these issues. But
not every constitutional issue—not even every constitutional issue involving
our most important freedoms—is of the same grand character. Even as to
our most important constitutional rights, incursions can be large or small.
On many constitutional issues, it seems likely that legislative debate would
suffer from the same defects that infect debate over any law that harms the
populace only slightly while providing substantial benefits to a concentrated
group.
Consider an example. “Food libel” statutes, which provide a cause of
action for disparagement of perishable commodities,203 pose a threat to
freedom of speech, which is one of our most important constitutional rights
(even Professor Tushnet agrees that it matters whether the people can
enforce their right to free expression).204 Yet the speech such laws target is
speech that most people have no great desire to engage in. Such laws
therefore make only a small incursion on the rights of the general populace.
At the same time, they provide a benefit of considerable importance to the
food industry. It is easy to see how such laws could get onto the books in
numerous states,205 despite the obvious First Amendment issues they raise.206

199.
E.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (21st prtg. 2003); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227–33 (1986).
200.
E.g., OLSON, supra note 199; Macey, supra note 199, at 227–33.
201.
See Waldron, supra note 2, at 1349–50, 1382–85.
202.
See id. at 1384–85.
203.
See David J. Bederman, Food Libel: Litigating Scientific Uncertainty in a Constitutional
Twilight Zone, 10 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 191, 194–201 (1998) (reviewing such statutes).
204.
Professor Tushnet derides most of the Constitution’s provisions as not “thrill[ing] the
heart,” TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 10, and suggests that he does not particularly care whether
most of them are enforceable, id. at 116, but he recognizes freedom of expression as one of the
“fundamental guarantees,” id. at 11.
205.
See Bederman, supra note 203, at 195–96 (noting thirteen states that have enacted
such laws).
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In a world without judicial review, anyone desiring to challenge such
laws on constitutional grounds would face the formidable, and probably
impossible, task of getting “the people” sufficiently exercised about this
minor incursion on their freedom of speech. Most individuals, even if made
aware of the First Amendment problem posed by food-libel laws, would
rationally choose to do nothing about them, since it would not be
worthwhile for most individuals to fight hard to change a law that they have
no great desire to disobey anyway. Meanwhile, food-industry representatives
would lobby hard to keep the laws on the books, and their efforts would be
backed by comparatively greater resources. It is not hard to predict who
would win this legislative battle.
And yet, although the constitutional claim against food-libel laws would
probably lose in the legislative arena, the claim is hardly trivial. It lies at the
heart of the interests protected by the First Amendment. If the food supply
were unsafe, calling attention to the problem would be a matter of great
public moment. Free speech and a free press could play a vital role in
protecting the populace against the hazards posed by a food supplier that
chooses to sacrifice safety in the name of profit. But again, because unsafe
food poses only a slight risk to the life and health of any one individual,
most individuals would not have a great interest in fighting hard to preserve
the freedom to criticize foods, and it would therefore be difficult to win the
battle against food-libel laws legislatively.
Thus, collective-action problems might block legislative remedies for
constitutional violations, even for violations of our most cherished
freedoms.207 The judicial process, being individually engageable, is far less
susceptible to such collective-action problems. To be sure, one might point
to some collective-action problems in the judicial process too. The process
does require a single person or interest group to take on the burden and
expense of litigating a claim, even though the resulting benefit might accrue
to society at large, and a small group that benefits from a constitutional
violation could be expected to fight hard in the courts, as it would in the
206.
See id. at 202 (arguing that most states’ food-libel statutes do not satisfy basic
requirements of the First Amendment); Howard M. Wasserman, Two Degrees of Speech Protection:
Free Speech Through the Prism of Agricultural Disparagement Laws, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 323,
403–04 (2000) (concluding that food-libel statutes ignore fundamental free-speech principles).
207.
The collective-action problem is just one of the pathologies of the legislative process
that might infect constitutional debates in a world without judicial review. In such a world, we
would also expect a sharp increase in constitutional violations that harm the populace at large
while benefiting the special class of legislators themselves, especially by making it harder to turn
legislators out of office. Pathologies of this kind would be particularly hard to remedy through
the legislative process because they would affect the process itself. Malapportionment, for
example, could be impossible to remedy through the legislative process precisely because those
that it harms are thereby disadvantaged in that very process. Similarly, laws prohibiting speech
on political issues could be hard to change because speech is a vital tool in promoting such
change. These may be the kind of pathologies that Professor Kramer has in mind as possibly
justifying judicial review. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 166.
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legislature. But experience shows that ideological plaintiffs are willing to
take on such battles, and in the courts, the playing field is much more level.
The plaintiff is not required to achieve active support from a widely
dispersed populace that is only slightly affected. The process is not
intrinsically rigged against claims of minor incursions to important
freedoms. Once again, the judicial process is not perfect, but, as a
comparative matter, it is far less susceptible to collective-action problems
than the legislative process.
*****
In sum, the legislative process does have certain important advantages
over the electoral process as a mechanism for the enforcement of
constitutional rights. It is at least capable of giving focused consideration to
a constitutional claim and of passing judgment on such a claim, complete
with a statement of reasons.
But the legislative process also has a huge disadvantage in that it is
discretionary. A legislature might choose to ignore constitutional grievances,
and “the people” would have no way to force the legislature into action. The
legislature might also choose to entangle a constitutional issue with other
issues in a way that blocks a clear judgment, and the people would have no
way to demand a discrete vote on the constitutional question. And even
where a legislature focuses cleanly on a constitutional issue, the legislative
process has the disadvantage of being beset by collective-action problems.
Particularly where a constitutional violation harms people only mildly and
benefits a concentrated group, those desiring change may find it impossible
to collect enough support to achieve legislative success.
These institutional features of the legislative process, like the features of
the electoral process considered in the previous section, must be considered
in addition to the feature that has received the most attention in the existing
literature—its majoritarian nature. The existing literature correctly notes
that the majoritarian nature of the legislative process makes the process a
poor vehicle for enforcing constraints on majoritarianism. But once again,
that is only part of the story. Other features of the process, particularly its
discretionary quality, also make a right that is enforceable only through the
legislative process hardly something that can be called a “right” at all.208

208.
One other institutional distinction between the legislative and judicial processes has
received some previous attention: defenders of judicial review observe that legislation is abstract
and generalized, whereas judicial review acts on particular cases. Defenders of judicial review
consider this to be an institutional advantage. E.g., BICKEL, supra note 8, at 26. However, this
Article does not rely on this distinction because, as the popular constitutionalists correctly point
out, this argument is unconvincing. Defenders of judicial review claim that courts have an
advantage because they see how their decisions will affect particular, flesh-and-blood cases. But
in fact, cases become more abstract as they ascend through levels of the judicial system, and
decisions at the highest level are, in effect, abstract decisions that could be made just as well in
the absence of any particular case. Waldron, supra note 2, at 1379–80; see also David M. Driesen,
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III. THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
The foregoing analysis of the institutional differences between the
judicial process and the electoral and legislative processes permits a new
understanding of the case for judicial review. Judicial review is superior
because of all of its institutional characteristics, not merely because of the
political insulation of judges.
In considering the normative case for or against judicial review, the
previous literature has focused predominantly on the question of whether
judges might be expected to be better at interpreting the Constitution than
legislators.209 Defenders of judicial review have claimed that judges will do a
better job of interpreting the Constitution because they will not be subject to
the majoritarian pressures that come from having to seek reelection. Freed
from these pressures, judges will apply the Constitution fearlessly and
honestly, even when constitutional restrictions on majoritarian rule clash
with the desires of short-term majorities. Legislators, however, will feel
pressure to cater to short-term political interests at the expense of long-term
principles.210
Popular constitutionalists, by contrast, have touted the ability of
legislators to think deeply and honestly about constitutional rights.211 They
claim that legislators can reach judgments that respect the rights of minority
groups while also having a democratic pedigree far superior to anything a
judicial judgment can provide.212 Popular constitutionalists also claim that
legislative judgments on constitutional questions are likely to be superior to
judicial judgments because the legislature is freer to focus on the full range
of moral and normative issues involved in addressing a question of right,
whereas courts focus unduly on constitutional text and precedent.213
In other words, both sides of the debate have focused on the question
of whether courts or legislatures might be expected to produce better
interpretations of the Constitution. That point is indeed an important factor
in the debate over judicial review. Still, it is just one factor. Equally
important is what the existence or nonexistence of judicial review means for
the enforceability of constitutional rights.

Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 808 (2004).
209.
As noted earlier, much of the existing literature also debates the question of whether
textual and historical analysis supports the conclusion that the U.S. Constitution provides for
judicial review. Such analysis is also quite important to the question of whether judicial review
should be practiced in the United States, but this Article is focused solely on normative and
institutional considerations.
210.
E.g., BICKEL, supra note 8, at 24–26.
211.
E.g., Waldron, supra note 2, at 1349, 1384.
212.
E.g., id. at 1349–50.
213.
Id. at 1385.
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The core of the case for judicial review is that a society’s Constitution
should be enforceable via a usable mechanism that creates an appropriate
likelihood that violations of the Constitution will be cured. The Constitution
is a set of instructions from the ultimate sovereign of society—the people—
vesting power in the officials who make up their government while at the
same time limiting that power. The people should want the constraints they
impose on their government to be real, enforceable constraints, which
requires that the constraints be safeguarded by an institution that has the
necessary characteristics to serve as an effective enforcement mechanism.
As this Article has demonstrated, judicial review provides a mechanism
for enforcement of constitutional constraints that is vastly superior to the
electoral or legislative processes. This is true because of all the institutional
characteristics of judicial review, not just because of the political insulation
of judges. A grievant who believes his constitutional rights have been
violated can seek a remedy in the judicial process as a matter of right,
without having to enlist support from others. The process will focus
specifically on his claim, decide it free of entanglement with other issues,
articulate reasons for the decision, and maintain rights thus established
through a system of precedent. The grievant might lose but would at least
obtain a result. Such a process provides a real enforcement mechanism for
constitutional constraints. The rights that it protects can therefore really be
called rights.
Without judicial review, as this Article has demonstrated, the grievant
would be remitted to enforcement processes that have completely different
structural characteristics. The grievant could, as the popular
constitutionalists observe, seek relief in the electoral and legislative
processes. But while these processes would be available, they lack the
institutional characteristics of the judicial process, and the likely result
would be considerable underenforcement of constitutional norms.
Either process would, first of all, compel the grievant to win the support
of many others for his claim.214 Moreover, even for a substantial group
sharing the same grievance, neither process is institutionally capable of
providing strong enforcement of constitutional constraints. If the group
tried to seek redress through the electoral process, that process would
entangle its claim with every other possible issue facing the electorate and
might not provide any relief even if the group’s favored candidates won the
election.215 The alternative would be for the group to seek relief from the
legislature, but the legislature would have the discretion to ignore it, might
be beset by collective-action problems, might or might not entangle the
group’s claim with other issues, and might be too busy to provide relief even

214.
215.

See supra Parts II.A.2.e, II.B.6.
See supra Part II.A.
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if it were sympathetic to the group’s claim.216 These formidable obstacles to
relief suggest that popular constitutionalism’s processes would lead to far
less effective enforcement of constitutional norms than would the judicial
process.
Indeed, these other processes are so different from the enforcement
mechanism provided by the judicial process that, by comparison, they hardly
seem like “enforcement mechanisms” at all. Certainly, they depart from the
ordinary expectations created by that term. A creditor seeking to “enforce” a
debt expects to do so in a straightforward proceeding in which the decision
maker hears the facts and determines whether the debt must be paid. If the
creditor were told that the process involved an election that required him to
garner general social support for his case and, moreover, that the debt owed
to him would be only one of dozens of issues in that election, the creditor
might be forgiven for thinking that the process was not only likely to lead to
underenforcement, but that it was not really an “enforcement” process at all.
Similarly, while one might say that popular constitutionalism is likely to lead
to underenforcement of constitutional norms, its enforcement mechanisms
are so different from the judicial process that it makes sense to question
whether they are enforcement mechanisms at all and whether a right
secured only by the electoral and political processes can really be called a
“right.” The institution of judicial review, by contrast, provides for an
enforceable Constitution.217
Thus, the case for judicial review goes far beyond the claim that judges
will be better than politically accountable officials at interpreting the
Constitution. Even if legislators could do an equally good job—perhaps even
a better job—of interpreting the Constitution, one would still want their
handiwork subjected to judicial review. The case for judicial review is that a
society should want its Constitution enforced by an institution that has the
characteristics of the judicial process: a process that is focused, transparent,
mandatory, rights based, individually engageable, and that respects
precedent.
For these reasons, it is unnecessary for defenders of judicial review to
prove that judges will have the best interpretation of the Constitution. As
defenders of judicial review have argued, there are in fact institutional
reasons to believe that courts will often do a better job than legislatures
when it comes to constitutional interpretation.218 But even if, like the
popular constitutionalists, one believed that on some issues the popularly
elected legislature would have a better insight into constitutional meaning,
one would still wish to retain the system of judicial review. Judicial review is
216.
See supra Part II.B.
217.
Cf. Weinberg, supra note 36, at 1412 (“In Marbury, a great father of our country
bequeathed to us his greatest legacy and our most precious inheritance—the inestimable
treasure of an enforceable Constitution.” (footnote omitted)).
218.
See supra Parts II.A.2.d, II.B.5.
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normatively desirable, not merely because there are reasons to believe courts
will better interpret the Constitution, but because only a system of judicial
review has the appropriate institutional structure to provide a suitable
degree of enforcement of constitutional constraints on government.219
IV. IMPROVING JUDICIAL REVIEW
In arguing for a position, it is always important to consider potential
counterarguments. Although judicial review is superior to popular
constitutionalism as a method of constitutional enforcement for the reasons
explained above, even the staunchest defender of judicial review would have
to agree that the popular constitutionalists have exposed at least one
substantial problem with judicial review. However, this Article provides a
better answer to this problem than prior arguments. This answer also helps
in understanding a potential solution.
The problem is that there is something uncomfortably arbitrary in the
selection of judges, particularly with regard to the limited number of judges
on the Supreme Court. With regard to the federal judiciary overall, there are
enough positions that at any given time one can expect the number of
sitting judges appointed by each political party to be roughly proportional to
the number of years that party controlled the White House over the last
couple of generations.220 But with regard to the Supreme Court, there are
too few spots for the law of averages to operate fairly. The composition of
the Supreme Court is determined by the vagaries of illness, death, and
retirement among a very small group of judges.221 Because this one court
plays the chief role in determining our nation’s constitutional
219.
As noted earlier, judicial review does, admittedly, suffer from being constrained by
justiciability requirements. See supra Part II.B.4. Someone who believes the Constitution is being
violated might not immediately be able to seek a judicial remedy because he might lack
standing to do so or might be constrained by some other justiciability issue. A full solution
would require some changes in the justiciability requirements. See Siegel, supra note 193, at
129–38 (proposing reforms to existing justiciability law). But that is a contingent feature of the
U.S. Constitution that does not really impact the argument about whether a generalized society
with a representative legislature and nonrepresentative courts should desire to have a system of
judicial review.
220.
For example, as of the date of this writing, there are currently 437 Republican
appointees in the federal judiciary and 352 Democratic appointees. GOP Candidates Would Cut
Federal Judges’ Power, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
gop-candidates-would-cut-federal-judges-power/2011/10/23/gIQA5u4Z9L_story.html. If one
looks back thirty-five years (that being about as long as long-serving judges tend to spend in
office), Republicans have controlled the White House for twenty-one years out of the last thirtyfive. Thus, over the last thirty-five years, Republicans have controlled the White House 60% of
the time, and they have appointed 55% of current federal judges, a roughly matching
percentage.
221.
Of course, Justices can, and probably do, time their retirements so that Presidents of
their preferred political party can name their successors. But Justices have much less control
over illness and death, and health problems may force them to retire at a time when their
preferred party does not control the White House.
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jurisprudence, it hardly seems fair that its composition should be
determined so arbitrarily.
To put it another way, it seems more than a little absurd that the
ultimate reason for important elements of constitutional jurisprudence as it
exists today may lie in the stupendous approval ratings enjoyed by the first
President Bush immediately following the Gulf War in 1991. But for that,
everything might be different. President Bush’s approval ratings made his
reelection seem inevitable, which may have influenced Justice Thurgood
Marshall’s decision to retire in 1991, rather than to stick it out one more
year.222 If Justice Marshall had stayed on until 1992, President Clinton,
rather than President Bush, would have named his successor.223 In that case,
Justice Marshall’s seat would likely now be filled by a moderately liberal
Justice, rather than by the very conservative Justice Clarence Thomas. As a
result, the many 5-4 decisions won by the Court’s conservative wing since
then would probably have come out 5-4 the other way.224
Thus, it seems highly likely that the vagaries of history and a single
Justice’s decision to retire have decisively influenced our national
understanding of free speech,225 equal protection,226 abortion rights,227 state

222.
Justice Marshall announced his retirement on June 27, 1991. Andrew Rosenthal,
Marshall Retires from High Court; Blow to Liberals, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 1991),
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/28/us/marshall-retires-from-high-court-blow-to-liberals.html.
At the end of February 1991, following the Gulf War, President George H.W. Bush had an
approval rating as high as 91%. E.g., Sharen Shaw Johnson, Poll: Bush Backed by 91%, USA
TODAY, Mar. 1, 1991, at 1A. That rating was still 75% in June 1991. Andrew Rosenthal, Poll
Finds Strong War Support, but Some Erosion, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 1991), http://www.nytimes.
com/1991/06/11/us/poll-finds-strong-war-support-but-some-erosion.html. Who could have
guessed that just a year later President Bush’s approval rating would be down to 29%? The
Gallup Organization, Bush, GOP Ratings Still Falling, New Poll Shows, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 4, 1992),
http://articles.latimes.com/1992-08-04/news/mn-5085_1_bush-s-approval-rating. Who could
have guessed that Bill Clinton, then the virtually unknown Governor of Arkansas, would best
him in the 1992 election?
223.
Justice Marshall probably would not have needed to stay on until 1993, when
President Clinton took office (in fact, Justice Marshall died just a few days after that happened).
If Justice Marshall had stayed on until sometime in late 1992, the Democrats, who then
controlled the Senate, could legitimately have refused to let his seat be filled until after the
election.
224.
It is also possible that President Bush’s approval ratings made no difference in Justice
Marshall’s decision to retire, which might have been dictated solely by the state of his health.
But if that is so, the above analysis is equally applicable. It is equally, if not more, absurd that
our constitutional jurisprudence for decades should be determined by the fortuity of exactly
when a given Justice develops health problems.
225.
See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (holding, 5-4, that the
government may not suppress political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity).
226.
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
(striking down, 5-4, the use of racial preferences in the assignment of students to slots in
oversubscribed high schools).
227.
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding, 5-4, the
constitutionality of the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act).
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sovereign immunity,228 Congress’s commerce power,229 and innumerable
other vital constitutional doctrines. This state of affairs is hardly a triumph
for the system of judicial review. It seems quite arbitrary. Waldron, in his
article, imagines the difficulties of explaining to a disgruntled citizen why
unelected judges get to make crucial societal decisions.230 Certainly, if one
were called upon to explain constitutional law today and to give the reasons
why so many constitutional doctrines are what they are, it would be
unsatisfying to say: “The ultimate reason is that Justice Thurgood Marshall
retired in 1991, rather than in 1992. But for that, the First Amendment, the
Equal Protection Clause, and innumerable other parts of the Constitution
would mean something different from what they mean today.” And yet, that
is probably the truth.
This, then, is where the popular constitutionalist arguments have real
bite. As Waldron points out, judges do more than enforce the Constitution;
they choose from among the multiple possible competing interpretations of
the broad phrases in the Constitution.231 The choice of the judges who make
these contestable choices has a vital impact on the outcome. And yet, under
the U.S. Constitution, a stunningly arbitrary system determines which
Presidents get to choose Supreme Court Justices.
This is also where the standard defense of judicial review, contained in
the previously existing literature, is most vulnerable. As noted above, the
standard defense of judicial review primarily claims that courts, because of
their political insulation, will do a better job than legislatures of interpreting
the Constitution.232 The fact that numerous, important Supreme Court
judgments result more from the accidents of history than from the
persuasiveness of constitutional arguments undermines this claim. Even if
one agrees that judicial political insulation provides courts with an
advantage in constitutional interpretation, that advantage has to be set
against the disadvantage that results from the arbitrariness in the selection
of the small group of judges who make the most important constitutional
decisions. It is not a priori clear which effect outweighs the other.
The arguments made in this Article provide a better answer to this
problem. As this Article has shown, insulation from popular pressure is just
one relevant institutional feature of judicial review. That feature does provide

228.
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding, 5-4, that
Congress lacks power to abrogate state sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to its
commerce power).
229.
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding, 5-4, that provisions
of the Violence Against Women Act exceeded Congress’s commerce power); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding, 5-4, that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded
Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause).
230.
Waldron, supra note 2, at 1387–93.
231.
Id. at 1369, 1371.
232.
E.g., BICKEL, supra note 8, at 25–26; Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 1016, 1022.

A3_SIEGEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

5/6/2012 4:03 PM

THE INSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

1197

courts with some advantage in constitutional interpretation. But judicial
review is normatively desirable because of its other features as well. In
particular, even if courts, especially the Supreme Court, may not always have
the best interpretation of the Constitution, they at least provide a good
enforcement mechanism for the Constitution. The electoral and legislative
processes cannot do this. The arbitrariness involved in the selection of
judges does not undermine this distinction. The societal need for a good
constitutional enforcement mechanism suggests that society should retain
the system of judicial review even if the courts cannot always claim to have
the best interpretation of the Constitution.233
In other words, if the sole basis for judicial review is that courts are
thought to be better at constitutional interpretation, then anything that
undermines their claim to superiority leaves judicial review highly
vulnerable. But if judicial review is also normatively desirable because only
judicial review provides an appropriate constitutional enforcement
mechanism, then a weakness in that claim is less damaging. One may desire
to retain the system of judicial review because of the vital role it plays in the
enforcement of constitutional constraints while still recognizing that there is
a problem in the system of selecting judges.
This analysis also helps in appreciating the virtues of potential solutions
to the judicial-selection problem. The popular constitutionalists would solve
the problem by eliminating the judicial role in constitutional enforcement
and turning the interpretation of the Constitution over to elected
representatives. For all the reasons explained in this Article, however, that is
not a good solution. True, it would have the advantage that it would
substantially reduce the role of happenstance in selecting the group of
people who make constitutional decisions. The group would also be
sufficiently large that the role of happenstance in selecting any one member
would be much less likely to have a decisive impact on constitutional
decisions.
But the popular constitutionalists’ solution would achieve these virtues
only at great cost. Their solution would lead to severe underenforcement of
constitutional norms and would undermine the security of individual rights.
The problem is not just that the Constitution and the individual rights it
protects would be remitted to a majoritarian process. The problem is that
they would be remitted to a process that is, for all the reasons described in
this Article, not structured as a good constitutional enforcement
mechanism.
233.
Of course, if one thought that courts would be systematically worse than legislatures at
interpreting the Constitution, even their advantage in providing mechanisms for constitutional
enforcement might not justify retaining judicial review. But the arbitrariness inherent in
judicial selection does not show that courts will be systematically worse than legislatures at
interpreting the Constitution; it only undermines the strength of their claim to be systematically
better because of their political insulation.
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The arguments in this Article help in appreciating the virtues of a better
solution. If the virtue of judicial review is that it provides an appropriate
constitutional enforcement mechanism, but the vice is that judicial selection
is arbitrary, then the solution is to retain those characteristics of the system
that make it a proper enforcement mechanism, but to reduce the
arbitrariness. This solution would imbue judicial review with some degree of
majoritarianism, although not the degree desired by the popular
constitutionalists. The solution would imbue judicial review with that degree
of majoritarianism that is consistent with maintaining its institutional
character.
The revised system would not be majoritarian in the legislative sense.
For the reasons already explained, judges should not worry about reelection
as they make their decisions. Therefore, judges would not be politically
accountable once appointed. Nor should the system be majoritarian in a way
that would destroy the other vital, institutional characteristics of judicial
review highlighted in this Article: its focused nature, its mandatory
character, its ability to be individually engaged, and so on.
But without threatening any of these vital features of judicial review, the
process for selecting judges, particularly Justices, could be made more
majoritarian and less arbitrary. Doing so would not be complicated. All that
would be needed would be to shift the tenure of the highest judges from
indefinite terms to fixed, staggered terms. In the United States, the creation
of staggered eighteen-year terms, so that one Justice’s term would expire
every two years,234 is an obvious possibility—so obvious, indeed, that it has
been suggested multiple times before.235
Such a system would maintain the many advantages of judicial review
while avoiding the perils of popular constitutionalism. Because judges would
still not be politically accountable once appointed, they could still exercise
their counter-majoritarian function. Moreover, because the judicial process
would still be focused, mandatory, transparent, and so on, it would still
provide a superior constitutional enforcement mechanism. But the choice of
Justices, and therefore of constitutional doctrine, would be less arbitrary and
relate more directly to popular will. To be sure, there would be only a rough

234.
Of course, there would be some important details to work out. There would be
difficulty transitioning in a fair way from our current system to a system of fixed, staggered
terms. Moreover, even once the new system got going, there would be the question of what to
do if a Justice dies, retires, or is removed by impeachment before the expiration of her
eighteen-year term. Probably the system would allow the President to name a replacement to
finish out the remainder of that term. Such a rule would reintroduce a small part of the
arbitrary character of the current system, but, as noted several times in this Article, nothing is
perfect.
235.
E.g., Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, The Supreme Court Renewal Act: A Return
to Basic Principles, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 476
(Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006); Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren,
Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769 (2006).

A3_SIEGEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

5/6/2012 4:03 PM

THE INSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

1199

and imperfect translation of popular will into constitutional decisions. But it
would be better than what we have now.
The proposal for eighteen-year, staggered terms for Supreme Court
Justices is not new. But institutional analysis provides new support for the
proposal. Previous analyses were deficient because, so long as judicial review
is regarded as desirable precisely because it is counter-majoritarian, the
desire to improve majoritarian input into the selection of judges will be
difficult to explain. But as this Article has argued, judicial review is justified
by a whole set of institutional features, not just its nonmajoritarian
character. That makes it easier to understand why it would be desirable to
introduce some more majoritarian input into the system of judicial selection
while also desiring to retain the essential character of the institution of
judicial review.
V. CONCLUSION
Prior debate about judicial review has focused on just one of its
institutional features—the political insulation of judges. Judicial review is
normatively desirable, however, not only because of the political insulation
of judges, but because of the whole set of institutional features of the judicial
process: because the judicial process is focused, because it is transparent,
because it is mandatory, because it operates within a system of precedent,
and because it is individually engageable. These institutional features of
judicial review, acting together, provide an appropriate enforcement
mechanism for the Constitution and provide us with true individual rights.
They justify judicial review.

